Security Situation in Iraq and Syria: U.S. Policy Options and Implications for the Region

Middle East and North Africa

The House Armed Services Committee held a hearing this week to discuss the policy challenges and the U.S.'s options arising from the deteriorating security situations in Iraq and Syria.

The House of Representatives Armed Services Committee met July 29 to discuss the policy challenges arising from the deteriorating security situations in Iraq and Syria. Chairman Buck McKeon (R-CA) and Rep. Adam Smith (D-WA) opened the hearing with brief introductory remarks. Rep. Adam Smith (D-WA) commented during his remarks that one of the main policy problems facing Washington right now is the deficiency of U.S. credibility in the region.

Former House of Representatives Armed Services Committee Chairman Duncan Hunter began panelist testimony by recommending that the U.S. reestablish and re engage partners from the Anbar Awakening period of the U.S. occupation of Iraq.  He specifically noted that individuals--such as Gen. Ray Odierno and David Petraeus--could provide the leadership necessary to reestablish the team [and] re-engage with tribal leaders under similar dynamics that were present in Iraq during the Anbar Awakening of 2006.

George Washington University Professor of Political Science Dr. Steven Biddle continued with his testimony that outlined three options the U.S. could pursue.  First, the U.S. could provide limited, conditional military assistance in conjunction with a containment strategy to prevent the proliferation of ISIS to at-risk neighboring states. This was Dr. Biddle’s most preferred option. Second, the U.S. could employ a policy of containment, absent of military assistance. Third, the U.S. could provide the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) with unconditional military aid. Noting that proliferation of ISIS across the region was the most threatening prospect to U.S.interests in the region at this point in time, Dr. Biddle considered his third option unviable.  Dr. Biddle concluded his opening comments by noting that ISIS is not an existential threat to the U.S. directly, and that a long-term solution would include major political changes to Baghdad.

 

The third witness was Max Boot from the Council on Foreign Relations. He opened his testimony by arguing that a Shiite backlash would continue to grow as the Sunni-led ISIS insurgency grows stronger, indicating the strong regional undertones of the two conflicts in Iraq and Syria. Mr. Boot made three recommendations, the first of which was to support the Free Syrian Army, including supplying them with the training and equipment necessary to make them a more effective and politically moderate force. Second, Boot stated that political changes needed to be made in Iraq, including a change in leadership in Baghdad where Nouri al-Maliki is no longer in power.  Finally, Boot recommended that President Obama needs to become more involved, arguing that the president’s prestige--rather than that of the Secretary of State--is needed to create a politically viable solution. To accomplish these three objectives, Boot suggested supporting the Iraqi Special Forces, the Kurdish Peshmerga, and Sunni tribes with advisors, intelligence specialists, and combat air controllers, arguing that these three groups represent political moderates that would help the U.S. in producing a successful, long-term political resolution.

 

The final witness to testify before the committee was New America Foundation fellow Brian Fishman, who argued that the most important, direct threat to the U.S. at this time is the flow of foreign fighters participating in these theaters of conflict, back to the U.S. and Western Europe. Fishman’s strategy included four recommendations, centering around containing the spread of ISIS while building the capacity of regional partners. First, argued that the U.S. should bolster its support for key regional allies, specifically Turkey and Jordan, the latter of which directly faces the threat of spillover from the Iraqi and Syrian conflicts. Second, Fishman argued that the U.S. should support the Syrian opposition with sustained military assistance.  Following that, he recommended that support to the ISF should be conditioned, citing similar observations made by Dr. Biddle.  Finally, Mr. Fishman noted that a political endgame of long-term governance needs to be considered, and specifically that current state boundaries should not be considered permanent.

 

Following the conclusion of opening statements, the committee chairman opened the hearing up to questions. One question raised addressed the importance of Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, ISIS’s military leader and self-proclaimed caliph, to the central leadership of the organization.  Mr. Boot noted that while eliminating the leader of an organization can halt the momentum of that organization new leaders can be regenerated. Thus, Boot suggested that eliminating ISIS leadership should be considered as part of a larger, comprehensive strategy.

Additionally, members of Congress inquired on the political end-state of Iraq and Syria, where either Syrian President Bashar al-Assad and/or Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki are no longer in power. Mr. Fishman reiterated points from his opening remarks that current borders do not need to be static, and that the U.S. can support political moderates in Syria as well as the Kurds, to cultivate a sustainable political end game for the region. Fishman argued that what benefits ISIS the most is the continuation of conflict, indicating the need for a political solution that would neutralize an otherwise metastasizing conflict.