Colombia's "15 Measures Against Impunity"
On Monday Colombia’s defense minister, flanked by the commanders of the armed forces and police, the prosecutor-general and the vice president, announced the adoption of “15 Measures Against Impunity.” Rodrigo Rivera said the new set of policies would seek to speed up chronically slow (or inconclusive) prosecutions of the security forces’ human rights abuses.
When investigations don’t yield results rapidly, a cloak of doubt is held over the institution, which affects its legitimacy and stains military and police honor.
The link to the document laying out these 15 measures is currently broken, though Rivera’s speech offers a summary. It appears that one of these measures is to “institutionalize” cooperation with the civilian Prosecutor-General’s Office on human rights cases. This may mean (the wording is fuzzy) that there will be fewer disputes over whether a human rights case belongs in the civilian system, as Colombian jurisprudence requires, or in the military system, where impunity has long been virtually guaranteed.
The military’s efforts to keep human rights cases in its own justice system have worsened in recent years. And even when cases do make it into the civilian system — as in the notorious 2008 Soacha “False Positives” killings — the prosecution can drag on for many years.
While Colombia’s military may be committing fewer abuses lately, the persistence of impunity, even for new cases, continues to make large-scale U.S. military aid controversial. It also runs counter to the human rights conditions placed on U.S. assistance, which require the State Department to certify that Colombia’s armed forces are improving their cooperation with judicial investigators.
Minister Rivera’s new policy is welcome; it is the first time I’ve seen Colombia’s Defense Ministry take the initiative on the thorny impunity issue (as opposed to, for instance, “easier” policies like improvements in human rights training and procedures).
Nonetheless, it is just a policy. In its first ten months, the Santos government has adopted many ambitious policies and laws, from a plan to combat “new” paramilitary groups to the Victims’ Law passed last week. Once again, the real challenge will lie in implementing the policy.
As with taking land from usurpers or fighting paramilitary warlords, punishing military abusers will put the Santos government in direct confrontation with some very powerful, even ruthless, individuals and sectors. When push comes to shove, will the policy prove to be more than just a paper document?