Politics behind Argentina's diplomacy
In a provocative article published yesterday in the Argentine newspaper La Nación, Carlos Pagni analyzes political and power interests behind diplomatic relations in South America. The article highlights the “new” role Argentina is playing in the Western Hemisphere’s political scene.
Argentina has been criticized, since Nestor Kirchner’s administration and continuing through Cristina Kirchner’s government as well, for not having a coherent foreign policy. However, events from the past week provide evidence of the contrary. The role played by Nestor Kirchner as UNASUR’s Secretary General during the conflict between Colombia and Venezuela and last week’s joint press conference by Secretary Clinton and Argentina’s Foreign Affairs Minister, Hector Timerman, reveal that Argentina is playing a more active role in hemispheric politics. Drawing on these two episodes, the Argentine journalist reveals a network of relationships and motives underlying the mere fact of Argentina’s desire to have a more predominant role.
Argentina, Brazil, U.S. and Iran
The meeting between Clinton and Timerman and the subsequent press conference have deeper political implications than just strengthening ties between the United States and Argentina.
The origins of the Clinton-Timerman meeting go back to the Global Nuclear Summit in Washington, in May of 2010. Back then, Timerman, then Argentine Ambassador to the United States, was negotiating to get a photo opportunity for President Cristina Kirchner with President Obama.
General James Jones, Obama’s national security advisor, explained to Timerman the importance to the United States of restricting Iran’s illicit enrichment of uranium. Argentina’s support against Iran was not difficult to obtain. Argentina holds an international dispute with Iran over a 1994 terrorist attack against a Jewish Society building in Buenos Aires. In 2007, the Argentine government issued a request for the arrest of a group of Iranians, among which was the current defense minister of Iran. Timerman therefore suggested to Jones that it would be good for Obama to mention this to Cristina Kirchner at the Summit. This made Cristina and Obama’s picture finally possible.
In light of this, Timerman’s recent meeting with Secretary Clinton seems to confirm the tie between these two countries and the Argentine support for U.S. demands against Iran. This goes against Brazil’s posture on the issue, even though Argentina and Brazil are regional allies. However, in retrospect, Argentina’s and Brazil’s history of disputes and competition over regional leadership could indicate that Argentina has something to gain also from aligning with the United States in opposition to Brazil’s softer position toward Iran. In this sense, Argentina could regain some leverage over its ally and also more influence over regional issues.
The United States knows that Argentina’s support could also work as leverage over Brazil’s relationship with Iran. Brazil’s tie with Iran, sealed this year with the Brazil-Iran-Turkey negotiation agreement, was viewed with skepticism and mistrust by the Obama administration.
From Brazil’s perspective, its relationship with Iran is part of a bigger plan. Brazil wants to be a global player and a rule maker. To achieve this, Brazil knows that it has to get a permanent seat at the UN Security Council. This has been a longstanding objective of Itamaraty, Brazil’s Foreign Affairs Ministry. In addition, Brazil’s traditional stance in foreign policy has been one of neutrality and independence: Brazil will never be to the US either the type of ally that Colombia is or the type of opponent Venezuela currently is. Brazil’s link with Iran has to be viewed in light of this.
Lula’s political game with Iran puts Brazil at the center of international attention. Lula received Ahmadinejad in Brasilia in November 2009, and in May 2010 Brazil allied with Turkey to propose the suspension of sanctions against Iran in exchange for a nuclear fuel swap deal in Turkish territory. This strategic maneuvering, in which Brazil advocated against sanctions against Iran, placed it in an independent position and in a defiant role against the United States. But it also allowed Brazil to be seen as a mediator trying to bring Iran to improve relations with the western world by suggesting a solution to the problem, something the UN had tried before without success. In addition, Brazil has other motives in supporting Iran’s nuclear program: Brazil has one of the largest uranium deposits in the world and seeks to exploit this resource. In the end, the Security Council issued sanctions against Iran because the Brazil-Turkey-Iran agreement did not include an Iranian commitment to suspend its nuclear program.
Argentina, Colombia and Venezuela
Nestor Kirchner’s role in the agreement between President Santos and President Chavez was based on a series of off-the-record negotiations initiated from Buenos Aires to enhance relations, specifically with Colombia. On June 24, Alvaro García Jiménez, Colombia’s Ambassador to Argentina, invited Nestor Kirchner to a lunch with ambassadors from other Latin American countries. It was an intelligent move, according to the Argentine journalist, since it would not make the outgoing government of Uribe uncomfortable about getting together with a close friend of Chavez.
After Santos’ triumph in the presidential elections, the designation of María Angela Holguín, who until then had been Representative for the Andean Development Corporation in Argentina, was another step forward. The Kirchners sympathized with her, in part due to her friendship to one of Nestor Kirchner’s advisors, Juan Manuel Abal Medina.
Holguín and García Jiménez convinced Santos to include Buenos Aires in his tour around the region after his election. Santos and Kirchner met on July 26 at the Colombian ambassador’s residency, together with Kirchner’s advisors in UNASUR, Abal Medina y Rafael Follonier. They discussed Uribe’s accusation against Venezuela at the OAS.
Kirchner understood Uribe’s accusations, as many others did, to be a message sent to incoming President Santos of what future Colombian foreign policy should be. However, Venezuela chose to await Uribe’s exit to ease the tension between Venezuela and Colombia and avoid armed conflict. Carlos Pagni writes that Kirchner had several telephone conversations with Chavez in which he confirmed these concerns. Kirchner later traveled to Caracas and from there to Bogotá, where he met both presidents, during a five day tour. The August 10 Santa Marta meeting between Santos and Chávez, at which Colombia and Venezuela agreed to improve their relationship, followed shortly afterward. As a gesture, Santos named José Fernando Bautista, one of his main advisors during his campaign, as Ambassador to Venezuela. Chavez demanded that the FARC abandon their fight, when only six months before he had asked to grant them belligerent status.