U.S. Security Assistance to Yemen
On April 19, Yemeni counterterrorism forces, with assistance from United States drones, began an operation in southern Yemen against al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) training camps and senior officials, leaving between 47 and 65 militants dead. Officials from Saudi Arabia and Yemen are still identifying casualties. The attack, the first of its kind in months, followed one of the largest recorded open-air gatherings of al-Qaeda fighters in history, led by AQAP leader Nasir al-Wuhayshi. At the gathering, militants were seen assembling together and training in open defiance of the threat of a drone strike.
The extent of the U.S. involvement in the operation, however, remains unclear. According to U.S. officials, the attacks were led by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), despite President Obama’s previous assurances that the Department of Defense (DoD) would replace the CIA as the authority in charge of drone strikes. (After a Defense Department drone attack in December killed a dozen civilians, the Yemeni government reportedly banned DoD strikes in the country). In addition, unidentified U.S. personnel are said to have directly aided Yemeni forces by transporting Yemeni special operations teams to select locations. Press Secretary Jay Carney did not directly address U.S. involvement in the attacks, instead broadly recognizing the relationship between the U.S. and Yemen and directing questions about the operation to the Yemeni government: “Now, I can’t speak to specific operations, but we have a strong, collaborative relationship, as you know, with the Yemeni government and work together on various initiatives to counter the shared threat we face from AQAP.”
U.S. security assistance to Yemen began in earnest after the bombing of the USS Cole in 2000, rising to higher levels in 2006 after the introduction of Section 1206 Train and Equip funding. The Obama administration further increased its commitment to Yemen in 2009 in light of the National Security Council’s Yemen Strategic Plan, which emphasized a renewal of Yemen as a strategic partner. According to a Center for Strategic and International Studies report, in Yemen’s case, this meant “focusing on combating AQAP in the short term, increasing development assistance to meet long-term challenges, and marshalling support for global efforts to stabilize Yemen.” To support its short term efforts to deny and disrupt AQAP networks and affiliates, the U.S. “deployed advisory teams and aid in counterterrorism and counterinsurgency since 2011, including personnel from the CIA and Joint Special Operations Command (JSOC) as well as used Unmanned Combat Aerial Vehicles (UCAVs).”
The more engaged U.S. presence was accompanied by a larger commitment of U.S. security assistance funding. Though modest, security assistance in the form of Foreign Military Financing (FMF) steadily increased beginning in 2010, to the current figure of close to $19 million. According to a Congressional Research Service report, ”Yemen: Background and U.S. Relations,” Yemen uses its FMF funding to sustain the Air Force’s two C-130H aircraft and serviceable F-5 fighter jets, to equip and train its Coast Guard, and to fund small arms and equipment purchases, among other activities.
The bulk of U.S. security assistance to Yemen is transmitted through the relatively new Section 1206 account. Section 1206 “provides the Secretary of Defense with authority to train and equip foreign military forces for two specified purposes—counterterrorism and stability operations—and foreign security forces for counterterrorism operations.” Indeed, in “June 2013, the Department of Defense notified Congress of its intent to spend $47.3 million in FY2013 Section 1206 funding for counterterrorism security assistance in Yemen…[and in] December 2013, the Department of Defense notified Congress of its intent to spend $64 million in FY2014 Section 1206 funds…” to support Yemen’s counterterrorism forces and capabilities. This figure made Yemen the number one recipient of Section 1206 funding in 2014 and the largest recipient of aid since 2006, with over $400 million in total 1206 funding. It should also be noted that the U.S. contributed over $80 million in security assistance using funds from the Section 1207 Security and Stabilization Assistance and 1207(n) Transitional Authority accounts. $8.8 million in FY2007 was authorized under the section 1207 Security and Stabilitzation Assistance account. Section 1207, which is now expired, provided another means for the DoD to train and equip foreign security forces. The section 1207(n) Transitional Authority account, as part of the new Global Security Contingency Fund, was created in 2010 to help support various activities in Yemen and East Africa. $75 million in FY2012 funds were directed to Yemen from this account.
Questions remain, however, as to the efficacy of U.S. security assistance to Yemen and the use of drone strikes a means to fight terrorism. A Government Accountability Office (GAO) report published in March 2013, for example, said that a lack of sufficient oversight concerning section 1206 and 1207(n) funds prevented an accurate assessment of the effectiveness of U.S. military assistance in Yemen.