Western Hemisphere Security Cooperation Act of 2012

Bill Number:

H.R. 6067

Bill Status:

Bill introduced in Committee

Bill Location:

House of Representatives

Date of Last Action:

Friday, June 29, 2012

Link to entire bill at the Library of Congress site.

Relevant Text:

HR 6067 IH

112th CONGRESS

2d Session

H. R. 6067

To enhance the security of the Western Hemisphere and bolster regional capacity and cooperation to counter current and emerging threats, to promote cooperation in the Western Hemisphere to prevent the proliferation of nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons, to secure universal adherence to agreements regarding nuclear nonproliferation, and for other purposes.

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

June 29, 2012

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN (for herself, Mr. MCKEON, Mr. CHABOT, Mr. MACK, Mr. BURTON of Indiana, Mr. RIVERA, Mr. DIAZ-BALART, Mr. MCCAUL, Mrs. SCHMIDT, Mr. DUNCAN of South Carolina, Mr. TURNER of New York, and Mr. BILIRAKIS) introduced the following bill; which was referred to the Committee on Foreign Affairs, and in addition to the Committees on the Judiciary, Financial Services, and Oversight and Government Reform, for a period to be subsequently determined by the Speaker, in each case for consideration of such provisions as fall within the jurisdiction of the committee concerned

A BILL

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE AND TABLE OF CONTENTS.

(a) Short Title- This Act may be cited as the `Western Hemisphere Security Cooperation Act of 2012'.

(b) Table of Contents- The table of contents for this Act is as follows:

Sec. 1. Short title and table of contents.

Sec. 2. Definitions.

TITLE I--COUNTERTERRORISM IN THE WESTERN HEMISPHERE

Sec. 101. Findings.

Sec. 102. Statement of policy relating to Iran, Hezbollah, and other foreign terrorist organizations.

Sec. 103. Statement of policy relating to certain international agreements.

Sec. 104. Notifications relating to travel by Cuban Government officials within or to the United States.

Sec. 105. Preventing oil benefits, land expropriation, and terrorism expansion.

Sec. 106. Amendments to annual country reports on terrorism.

Sec. 107. Amendments to international drug control certification procedures.

Sec. 108. Amendment to international narcotics control strategy report.

Sec. 109. International Law Enforcement Academy in San Salvador, El Salvador.

Sec. 110. United States efforts in the Western Hemisphere.

Sec. 111. Amendments to the Department of State Rewards Program.

Sec. 112. Establishment of a Western Hemisphere Regional Coordination Center.

Sec. 113. Transfer of funds to the Central American Regional Security Initiative.

Sec. 114. Administration of security assistance programs for Central American countries.

Sec. 115. Restriction on assistance for the Guatemalan Army.

TITLE II--NONPROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR, CHEMICAL, AND BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS IN THE WESTERN HEMISPHERE

Sec. 201. Findings.

Sec. 202. Statement of policy regarding the proliferation of weapons-related nuclear, chemical, and biological materials, technology, and facilities.

Sec. 203. Statement of policy regarding the small quantities protocol.

Sec. 204. Securing adherence to agreements regarding nuclear nonproliferation by countries in the Western Hemisphere.

Sec. 205. Halting the proliferation of nuclear fuel fabrication.

Sec. 206. Cooperation with the Proliferation Security Initiative.

Sec. 207. Establishment of the Western Hemisphere Nonproliferation Partnership Initiative.

Sec. 208. Foreign policy controls.

Sec. 209. Limitation on arms transfers.

Sec. 210. Restrictions on nuclear cooperation with countries assisting the nuclear program of Venezuela or Cuba.

TITLE III--ORGANIZATION OF AMERICAN STATES

Sec. 301. Actions regarding the Organization of American States.

TITLE IV--MISCELLANEOUS PROVISIONS

Sec. 401. Prohibitions on engagement with certain Western Hemisphere countries.

Sec. 402. Report.

SEC. 2. DEFINITIONS.

Except as otherwise provided, in this Act:

(1) APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES- The term `appropriate congressional committees' means--

(A) the Committee on Foreign Affairs; and

(B) the Committee on Foreign Relations.

(2) NONHUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE- The term `nonhumanitarian assistance' means--

(A) any assistance under the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (including programs under title IV of chapter 2 of part I of such Act, relating to the Overseas Private Investment Corporation), other than--

(i) disaster relief assistance, including any assistance under chapter 9 of part I of such Act;

(ii) assistance which involves the provision of food (including monetization of food) or medicine; and

(iii) assistance for refugees;

(B) sales, or financing on any terms, under the Arms Export Control Act; and

(3) STATE SPONSOR OF TERRORISM- The term `state sponsor of terrorism' means a country the government of which has been determined by the Secretary of State, for purposes of section 6(j) of the Export Administration Act of 1979 (as continued in effect under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act), section 620A of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, section 40 of the Arms Export Control Act, or any other provision of law, is a government that has repeatedly provided support for acts of international terrorism.

TITLE I--COUNTERTERRORISM IN THE WESTERN HEMISPHERE

SEC. 101. FINDINGS.

Congress finds the following:

(1) In 2004, a Lebanese individual, having entered the United States illegally from Mexico, was charged with supporting Hezbollah financially and was described by the United States Attorney as a `fighter, recruiter and fundraiser'.

(2) In December 2006, the Department of the Treasury designated nine individuals and two entities as part of a network that is `a major financial artery to Hezbollah in Lebanon' and announced an effort to target Hezbollah fundraising in the tri-border area of Brazil, Argentina, and Paraguay.

(3) In 2007, the Chavez regime established routine civilian airline flights between Venezuela and designated State Sponsors of Terrorism, Iran, and Syria.

(4) In November 2007, Interpol's General Assembly agreed to issue red capture notices for the arrest of a Hezbollah leader and five former senior Iranian officials charged by Argentina in the 1994 Argentine Mutual Jewish Association (AMIA) terrorist attack, in which 85 innocent people were killed and 300 more were wounded.

(5) In February 2008, Director of National Intelligence Mike McConnell reported to Congress in his presentation of the Intelligence Community's Annual Threat Assessment that the governments of Ecuador, Nicaragua, and Bolivia, `to varying degrees, have engaged in sharply anti-U.S. rhetoric, aligned with Venezuela and Cuba--and increasingly Iran--on international issues, and advocated measures that directly clash with U.S. initiatives'.

(6) In February 2008, a United States Federal law-enforcement official shared, `We've known for some time that Islamic extremists groups were gaining momentum and exploiting the region . . . Iran is no exception--now with Cuba and Venezuela, the door is open.'.

(7) Venezuela has concluded nearly 200 bilateral agreements with Iran on military cooperation, the sharing of intelligence, expanding financial cooperation, and initiating cultural exchanges, among others.

(8) According to United States intelligence officials, Iran possesses the potential to use its close relationship with Venezuela to facilitate the smuggling of people, drugs, and weapons into the Western Hemisphere through terrorist proxy groups.

(9) In March 2008, the Colombian army led a raid against the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia and seized computers containing documents that suggest evidence of $300,000,000 in payments to the extremist organization from the Venezuelan Government, high-level contacts by the FARC with officials from Ecuador and Venezuela, and efforts by the FARC to obtain 50 kilograms of uranium.

(10) In June 2008, the Department of the Treasury designated two Venezuela-based supporters of Hezbollah, Ghazi Nasr al Din and Fawzi Kan'an, along with two travel agencies owned and controlled by Kan'an, explaining it is `extremely troubling to see the Government of Venezuela employing and providing safe harbor to Hezbollah facilitators and fundraisers'.

(11) In October 2008, the Department of the Treasury designated Banco Internacional de Desarollo, C.A., a financial institution located in Venezuela, to be owned or controlled by or acting or purporting to act for or on behalf of, directly or indirectly, the Export Development Bank of Iran (EDBI). EDBI was designated for its role in helping Iran violate United Nations sanctions and handle its illicit transactions.

(12) In May 2010, for the fifth year in a row, the Department of State determined, pursuant to section 40A of the Arms Export Control Act, that Venezuela was not cooperating fully with United States antiterrorism efforts.

(13) In February 2011, the Department of the Treasury identified the Lebanese Canadian Bank as a financial institution of `primarily money laundering concern' under section 311 of the USA PATRIOT Act, for its role in facilitating the money laundering activities of an international narcotics trafficking network with ties to Hezbollah. This network is involved in moving illicit drugs and money laundering from South America to Europe and the Middle East through West Africa.

(14) In April 2011, General Douglas Fraser, General of U.S. Southern Command, testified before Congress that there are `growing opportunities for military-to-military connections' between Iran and Venezuela and that there are `flights between Iran and Venezuela on a weekly basis and visas are not required for entrance into Venezuela or Bolivia or Nicaragua'.

(15) In October 2011, the Drug Enforcement Administration and the Federal Bureau of Investigation charged two individuals for suspected participation in an Iranian Qods Force plot to murder the Saudi Arabian Ambassador on United States soil.

(16) In December 2011, Univision aired a documentary titled The Iranian Threat that exposed a plan to launch a cyber attack against the United States Government and nuclear facilities involving Iran, Cuba, and Venezuela.

(17) In January 2012, the Venezuelan Consul General in Miami, was declared persona non grata by the Department of State for her participation in a cyber attack and was expelled from the United States.

(18) A 2012 Drug Enforcement Administration report identified 38 percent of the organizations on the Foreign Terrorist Organizations list as having possible ties to the drug trade, underscoring the fact that the fight against terrorism must also include a corresponding fight against illicit drugs.

(19) In January 2012, Director of National Intelligence James R. Clapper reported to Congress in his presentation of the Intelligence Community's Annual Threat Assessment that `some Iranian officials have changed their calculus and are now willing to conduct an attack in the United States'.

(20) In January 2012, Henry Rangel Silva became the Defense Minister of Venezuela. The Department of Treasury had previously designated Silva a `drug kingpin' in 2008 due to his involvement with the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia.

(21) In March 2012, General Douglas Fraser, General of U.S. Southern Command, testified before Congress that `connections with Hezbollah and Hamas who have been in the region for a number of years primarily still focused on supporting, conducting illicit activity to provide funding support and logistic support back to parent organizations within the Middle East'.

(22) The Inter-American Convention Against Terrorism of the Organization of American States (OAS) commits all State parties to establish domestic regulatory institutions that eradicate the financing of terrorist offenses, cooperate with fellow signatories to control borders, provide mutual legal assistance in counterterrorism efforts and prosecution of terrorist offenses, and conform to all other stipulations of the convention designed to prevent, punish, and eliminate terrorist offenses.

(23) The countries within the Western Hemisphere that have ratified the Inter-American Convention Against Terrorism of the OAS are Antigua & Barbuda, Argentina, Brazil, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominica, the Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Grenada, Guatemala, Guyana, Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Trinidad & Tobago, the United States, Uruguay, and Venezuela.

SEC. 102. STATEMENT OF POLICY RELATING TO IRAN, HEZBOLLAH, AND OTHER FOREIGN TERRORIST ORGANIZATIONS.

It shall be the policy of the United States to--

(1) undertake a whole-of-government approach to deny Iran, or its proxies such as Hezbollah, or any other foreign terrorist organization, agent, or instrumentality of either, the resources to engage in activities that--

(A) threaten United States national security, its interests, and its allies;

(B) provide safe haven within the territories and boundaries of countries within the Western Hemisphere; and

(2) deter foreign investments and cooperation of countries within the Western Hemisphere that would enhance the ability of Iran, or any agent or instrumentality thereof, to develop nuclear, biological, or chemical weapons.

SEC. 103. STATEMENT OF POLICY RELATING TO CERTAIN INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS.

To enhance the security of the Western Hemisphere and bolster regional capacity to counter terrorism, it shall be the policy of the United States to promote the signing, ratification, and implementation by all countries in the Western Hemisphere of the following:

(1) OAS AG/RES. 1840 (XXXII-O/02) Inter-American Convention Against Terrorism.

(2) Financial Action Task Force (FATF) 40 Recommendations on Money Laundering (ML) and 9 Special Recommendations (SR) on Terrorist Financing (TF).

(3) The 1963 ICAO Convention on Offences and Certain Other Acts Committed on Board Aircraft.

(4) The 1970 ICAO Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft.

(5) The 1971 ICAO Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Civil Aviation.

(6) The 1973 United Nations Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes Against Internationally Protected Person, including Diplomatic Agents.

(7) The 1979 United Nations International Convention Against the Taking of Hostages.

(8) The 1988 ICAO Protocol for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts of Violence at Airports Serving International Civil Aviation, Supplementary to the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Civil Aviation.

(9) The 1988 IMO Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Maritime Navigation.

(10) The 1988 IMO Protocol for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Fixed Platforms Located on the Continental Shelf.

(11) The 1991 ICAO Convention on the Marking of Plastic Explosives for the Purpose of Detection.

(12) The 1997 United Nations International Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings.

(13) The 1999 United Nations International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism.

(14) The 2001 United Nations S/Res/1373 Creation of Counter Terrorism Committee (CTC).

(15) The 2005 United Nations S/Res/1624 Prohibition of incitement to commit terrorist act or acts.

(16) The 2010 ICAO Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Relating to International Civil Aviation.

SEC. 104. NOTIFICATIONS RELATING TO TRAVEL BY CUBAN GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS WITHIN OR TO THE UNITED STATES.

(a) Travel Within United States- The Secretary of State shall notify the appropriate congressional committees not less than 15 days prior to granting approval for travel by any Cuban official assigned to the Cuban Interests Section in Washington, DC or the Cuban United Nations Missions in New York, New York outside a 25-mile radius of the Cuban Interests Section in Washington, DC or the Cuban United Nations Missions in New York, New York, respectively.

(b) Travel to the United States- The Secretary of State shall notify the appropriate congressional committees not less than 15 days prior to issuing a visa for travel of any Cuban Government official to the United States

(1) The name and rank of the Cuban official for which the travel is approved.

(2) The expected dates, destination, and purpose of the travel.

(3) A separate certification that the travel does not pose a threat to United States interests and policy priorities and the travel has been approved by the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Assistant Secretary of State for Diplomatic Security, and the head of any other relevant department or agency. The certification may be provided in a classified annex to the notification if applicable.

SEC. 105. PREVENTING OIL BENEFITS, LAND EXPROPRIATION, AND TERRORISM EXPANSION.

(a) Statement of Policy- It shall be the policy of the United States to--

(1) undertake the necessary measures to deny the Government of Cuba, the Cuban Communist Party, or any agent or instrumentality of either, the financial resources to engage in activities that threaten--

(A) United States national security, its interests, and its allies;

(B) Florida's marine environment, including the most extensive living coral reef system in North American waters and the third largest in the world;

(D) to prolong the dictatorship that oppresses the Cuban people; and

(2) deter foreign investments that would enhance the ability of the Government of Cuba, or any agent or instrumentality thereof, to develop its petroleum resources.

(b) Exclusion From the United States of Aliens Who Contribute to the Ability of Cuba To Develop Petroleum Resources Located Off Cuba's Coast-

(1) IN GENERAL- The Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity (LIBERTAD) Act of 1996 (22 U.S.C. 6021 et seq.) is amended by inserting after section 401 the following:

`SEC. 402. EXCLUSION FROM THE UNITED STATES OF ALIENS WHO CONTRIBUTE TO THE ABILITY OF CUBA TO DEVELOP PETROLEUM RESOURCES LOCATED OFF CUBA'S COAST.

`(a) In General- The Secretary of State shall deny a visa to, and the Secretary of Homeland Security shall exclude from the United States, any alien who the Secretary of State determines is a person who--

`(1) is an officer or principal of an entity, or a shareholder who owns a controlling interest in an entity, that, on or after the date of the enactment of the Western Hemisphere Security Cooperation Act of 2012, has made or makes an investment that equals or exceeds $1,000,000 (or any combination of investments that in the aggregate equals or exceeds $1,000,000 in any 12-month period), that contributes to the enhancement of the ability of the Government of Cuba, or any agent or instrumentality thereof, to develop petroleum resources of the submerged lands located off Cuba's coast; or

`(2) is a spouse, minor child, or agent of a person described in paragraph (1).

`(b) Waiver- The Secretary of State may waive the application of subsection (a) if the Secretary certifies and reports to the appropriate congressional committees, on a case-by-case basis, that the admission to the United States of a person described in subsection (a)--

`(1) is necessary for critical medical reasons or for purposes of litigation of an action under title III of this Act; or

`(2) is appropriate if the requirements of sections 204, 205, and 206 of this Act have been satisfied.

`(c) Definitions- In this subsection:

`(1) AGENT AND INSTRUMENTALITY- The terms `agent' and `instrumentality' shall include the Cuban Communist Party.

`(2) DEVELOP- The term `develop', with respect to petroleum resources, means the exploration for, or the extraction, refining, or transportation by pipeline or other means of, petroleum resources.

`(3) INVESTMENT- The term `investment' means any of the following activities if such activity is undertaken pursuant to an agreement, or pursuant to the exercise of rights under such an agreement, that was or is entered into with the Government of Cuba (or any agency or instrumentality thereof) or a nongovernmental entity in Cuba, on or after the date of the enactment of the Western Hemisphere Security Cooperation Act of 2012:

`(A) The entry into a contract that includes responsibility for the development of petroleum resources of the submerged lands located off Cuba's coast, or the entry into a contract providing for the general supervision and guarantee of another person's performance of such a contract.

`(B) The purchase of a share of ownership, including an equity interest, in such development.

`(C) The entry into a contract providing for the participation in royalties, earnings, or profits in such development, without regard to the form of the participation.

`(D) The entry into, performance, or financing of a contract to sell or purchase goods, services, or technology related to such development.

`(4) PETROLEUM RESOURCES- The term `petroleum resources' includes petroleum and natural gas resources, petroleum by products, and liquified natural gas.'.

(2) CLERICAL AMENDMENT- The table of contents for the Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity (LIBERTAD) Act of 1996 is amended by inserting after the item relating to section 401 the following:

`Sec. 402. Exclusion from the United States of aliens who contribute to the ability of Cuba to develop petroleum resources located off Cuba's coast.'.

(3) EFFECTIVE DATE- The amendments made by this subsection shall apply to aliens seeking admission to the United States on or after the date of the enactment of this Act.

(1) IN GENERAL- If the President determines that a person has, on or after the date of the enactment of this Act, made an investment that equals or exceeds $1,000,000 (or any combination of investments that in the aggregate equals or exceeds $1,000,000 in any 12-month period) that contributes to the enhancement of the ability of the Government of Cuba, or any agent or instrumentality thereof, to develop petroleum resources of the submerged lands located off Cuba's coast, or has made an investment of any amount of money that contributes to such an enhancement and has trafficked in confiscated United States property, the President shall impose two or more of the following sanctions:

(A) PROHIBITION ON LOANS AND GUARANTEES- Prohibit the issuance by the Overseas Private Investment Corporation, the Export-Import Bank of the United States, or any other United States instrument of any loan, guarantee, insurance, extension of credit, or participation in the extension of credit in connection with the export of any goods or services to any sanctioned person.

(B) EXPORT SANCTION- Prohibit the issuance by the United States Government of any specific license and or other specific permission or authority to export any goods or technology to a sanctioned person under--

(i) the Export Administration Act of 1979 (as continued in effect under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act);

(ii) the Arms Export Control Act;

(iii) the Atomic Energy Act of 1954; or

(iv) any other statute that requires the prior review and approval of the United States Government as a condition for the export or reexport of goods or services.

(C) PROHIBITIONS ON FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS- The following prohibitions may be imposed against a sanctioned person that is a financial institution:

(i) PROHIBITION ON DESIGNATION AS PRIMARY DEALER- Prohibit the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System and the Federal Reserve Bank of New York from designating, or permitting the continuation of any prior designation of, such financial institution as a primary dealer in United States Government debt instruments.

(ii) PROHIBITION ON SERVICE AS A REPOSITORY OF GOVERNMENT FUNDS- Prohibit such financial institution from serving as agent of the United States Government or serving as repository for United States Government funds.

The imposition of either sanction under subparagraph (A) or (B) shall be treated as one sanction for purposes of this section, and the imposition of both such sanctions shall be treated as two sanctions for purposes of this section.

(D) PROCUREMENT SANCTION- Prohibit the United States Government from procuring, or entering into any contract for the procurement of, any goods or services from a sanctioned person.

(2) TERMINATION OF SANCTIONS- Sanctions imposed pursuant to paragraph (1) shall terminate if the President determines and certifies to the appropriate congressional committees that the requirements of sections 204, 205, and 206 of the Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity (LIBERTAD) Act of 1996 (22 U.S.C. 6064, 6065, and 6066) have been satisfied.

(3) PROHIBITION ON FACILITATION BY UNITED STATES PERSONS OF CUBA'S ABILITY TO DEVELOP PETROLEUM RESOURCES- It shall be unlawful for any United States person to provide materials, technical equipment, or other assistance that contributes to the enhancement of Cuba's ability to develop petroleum resources of the submerged lands located off Cuba's coast.

(4) REPORTS BY SECRETARY OF STATE- For each of the fiscal years 2013, 2014, and 2015, the Secretary of State shall submit to the Committee on Foreign Affairs and the Committee on Appropriations of the House of Representatives and the Committee on Foreign Relations and the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate a report relating to--

(A) investments that equal or exceed $1,000,000 (or any combination of investments that in the aggregate equals or exceeds $1,000,000 in any 12-month period) that contribute to the enhancement of the ability of the Government of Cuba, or any agent or instrumentality thereof, to develop petroleum resources of the submerged lands located off Cuba's coast, including information relating to the values of such investments, the identity of the persons making such investments, and proposed investments that would satisfy such criteria, and information relating to any sanctions that have been imposed pursuant to subsection (a) as a result of such investments; and

(B) investments of any amount of money, in conjunction with trafficking in confiscated United States property, that contribute to such an enhancement, including information relating to the values of such investments, the identity of the persons making such investments, and the identity of such confiscated property, and information relating to any sanctions that have been imposed pursuant to paragraph (1) as a result of such investments.

(5) ASSESSMENTS OF ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACTS OF DEVELOPMENT OF CUBA'S PETROLEUM RESOURCES-

(A) IN GENERAL- Not later than one year after the date of the enactment of this Act, and annually thereafter, the Secretary of State, in consultation with the Secretary of the Interior and the Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency, shall submit to the Committee on Foreign Affairs and the Committee on Natural Resources of the House of Representatives and the Committee on Foreign Relations and the Committee on Energy and Natural Resources of the Senate a report containing an assessment of the impact that the development of Cuba's petroleum resources has had on the environment and natural resources of the submerged lands located off Cuba's coast and Florida's marine environment.

(B) USE OF ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENTS- In preparing the assessment, the Secretary of State shall use as a model environmental impact statements prepared pursuant to the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (42 U.S.C. 4321 et seq.).

(6) DEFINITIONS- In this subsection--

(A) the terms `appropriate congressional committees', `confiscated', `person', `property', and `traffics' have the meaning given such terms in section 4 of the Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity (LIBERTAD) Act of 1996 (22 U.S.C. 6023), except that the term `person' shall also include, for purposes of this subsection, a foreign subsidiary of a person and United States subsidiary of a foreign person;

(B) the terms `develop', `investment', and `petroleum resources' have the meaning given such terms in section 402(c) of such Act, as added by subsection (b) of this section; and

SEC. 106. AMENDMENTS TO ANNUAL COUNTRY REPORTS ON TERRORISM.

(a) In General- Section 140(b) of the Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Years 1988 and 1989 (22 U.S.C. 2656f(b)) is amended--

(1) in paragraph (4)(D), by striking `and' at the end;

(2) in paragraph (5), by striking the period at the end and inserting a semicolon;

(3) by redesignating the second paragraph (3) and the second paragraph (4) as paragraphs (6) and (7), respectively;

(4) in paragraph (6), as so redesignated, by striking `and' at the end;

(5) in paragraph (7), as so redesignated, by striking the period at the end and inserting a semicolon; and

(6) by adding after such paragraph (7) the following new paragraphs:

`(8) a comprehensive assessment of all United States assistance available to combat terrorism in each country that is a subject of such report; and

`(9) with respect to countries in the Western Hemisphere that are the subjects of such report, the level in each such country of threat posed by radical Islamist terrorism.'.

(b) Effective Date- The amendments made by this subsection shall apply with respect to each report required to be transmitted to Congress under section 140 of the Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Years 1988 and 1989 on or after the date of the enactment of this Act

SEC. 107. AMENDMENTS TO INTERNATIONAL DRUG CONTROL CERTIFICATION PROCEDURES.

Section 706 of the Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Year 2003 (Public Law 107-228; 22 U.S.C. 2291j-1) is amended--

(1) in paragraph (2)--

(A) in subparagraph (A)(ii); by striking `and' at the end;

(B) by redesignating subparagraph (B) as subparagraph (C);

`(B) designate each country, if any, identified in such report in which a link has been determined to exist between illicit drug trafficking organizations and a designated foreign terrorist organization and that has failed demonstrably, during the previous 12 months, to make substantial efforts--

`(i) to adhere to its obligations under international counterterrorism agreements; and

`(ii) to implement effective counterterrorism measures, including action on such issues as the rule of law, denying safe haven to terrorists, financing and money laundering, and law enforcement; and'; and

(D) in subparagraph (C), as so redesignated, by inserting before the period at the end the following: `under subparagraph (A) or (B)';

(2) in paragraph (3)--

(A) in subparagraph (A), by striking `or' at the end;

(B) in subparagraph (B)(ii), by striking the period at the end and inserting `; or'; and

`(C) subsequent to the designation being made under paragraph (2)(B), the country has made substantial efforts--

`(i) to adhere to its obligations under international counterterrorism agreements; and

`(ii) to implement effective counterterrorism measures, including action on such issues as the rule of law, denying safe haven to terrorists, financing and money laundering, and law enforcement.';

(3) by redesignating paragraph (8) as paragraph (9); and

(4) by inserting after paragraph (7) the following new paragraph:

`(8) BILATERAL AGREEMENTS- If a country designated under subparagraphs (A) and (B) of paragraph (2) does not receive a determination under subparagraphs (B) or (C) of paragraph (3), the Secretary of State shall negotiate with such country a bilateral agreement describing actions to be taken by the United States and such country to satisfy such determinations during the one year period following such a designation. Such a bilateral agreement should include a needs assessment, a bilateral action plan, the provision of United States training and assistance, the use of International Law Enforcement Academy facilities in the region, and an exchange of model laws and best practices.'.

SEC. 108. AMENDMENT TO INTERNATIONAL NARCOTICS CONTROL STRATEGY REPORT.

Section 489(a) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2291h(a)) is amended by adding at the end the following new paragraph:

`(9) A separate section that contains information relating to any links between drug trafficking organizations, or money laundering and terrorists, terrorist acts, or designated foreign terrorist organizations (as such term is used in section 219 of the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1189)), and any actions taken by the United States Government or foreign government to address such links.'.

SEC. 109. INTERNATIONAL LAW ENFORCEMENT ACADEMY IN SAN SALVADOR, EL SALVADOR.

(a) Sense of Congress- It is the sense of Congress that the International Law Enforcement Academy (ILEA) in San Salvador, El Salvador, should continue to serve as a critical component of United States regional counterterrorism efforts.

(b) Negotiation- The Secretary of State shall coordinate with the heads of other appropriate United States Government agencies to ensure that counterterrorism, including radical Islamist extremism within the Western Hemisphere, nonproliferation, prison reform, prison fire safety, prison corrections training, the threat of gang violence, and border security courses are instituted as part of the core curriculum at the International Law Enforcement Academy in San Salvador.

SEC. 110. UNITED STATES EFFORTS IN THE WESTERN HEMISPHERE.

(a) Determination- For any country in the Western Hemisphere that the President has determined--

(1) is engaged in military cooperation with a state sponsor of terrorism,

(2) is engaged in nonmarket-based trade with a state sponsor of terrorism,

(3) is carrying out policies that threaten United States national security interests, or

(4) is not fully cooperating with United States counterterrorism or nonproliferation efforts,

the President is authorized to impose any of the sanctions described in subsection (b).

(b) Sanctions- For any country in the Western Hemisphere with respect to which the President has made a determination in accordance with subsection (a), the President is authorized to--

(1) suspend United States nonhumanitarian foreign assistance to the government of that country; and

(2) prohibit the sale, provision, or transfer of articles, including the issuance of any specific license or grant of any other specific permission or authority to export any goods or technology under--

(A) the Export Administration Act of 1979 (as continued in effect under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act);

(B) the Arms Export Control Act;

(D) any other statute that requires the prior review and approval of the United States Government as a condition for the export or re-export of goods or services.

SEC. 111. AMENDMENTS TO THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE REWARDS PROGRAM.

(a) In General- Section 36 of the State Department Basic Authorities Act of 1956 (22 U.S.C. 2708) is amended--

(1) in subsection (a)(2), by inserting `serious violations of international humanitarian law, transnational organized crime,' after `international narcotics trafficking,';

(2) in subsection (b)--

(A) in the matter preceding paragraph (1), by striking `Attorney General' and inserting `heads of other relevant departments or agencies';

(B) in paragraphs (4) and (5), by striking `paragraph (1), (2), or (3)' each place it appears and inserting `paragraph (1), (2), (3), (8), (9), (10), or (11)';

(i) by inserting `or transnational organized crime group' after `terrorist organization'; and

(ii) by striking `or' at the end;

(D) in paragraph (7)--

(i) in the matter preceding subparagraph (A), by striking `, including the use by the organization of illicit narcotics production or international narcotics trafficking' and inserting `or transnational organized crime group, including the use by such organization or group of illicit narcotics production or international narcotics trafficking';

(ii) in subparagraph (A), by inserting `or transnational organized crime' after `international terrorism'; and

(iii) in subparagraph (B)--

(I) by inserting `or transnational organized crime group' after `terrorist organization'; and

(II) by striking the period at the end and inserting a semicolon; and

(E) by adding at the end the following new paragraphs:

`(8) the arrest or conviction in any country of any individual wanted on terrorism charges pursuant to red notices duly issued by Interpol, if such reward would help advance United States interests or the interests of United States allies in the global struggle against international terrorism;

`(9) the arrest or conviction in any country of any individual for participating in, primarily outside the United States, transnational organized crime;

`(10) the arrest or conviction in any country of any individual conspiring to participate in or attempting to participate in transnational organized crime; or

`(11) the arrest or conviction in any country, or the transfer to or conviction by an international criminal tribunal (including a hybrid or mixed tribunal), of any foreign national accused of war crimes, crimes against humanity, or genocide, as defined under the statute of such tribunal.';

(3) in subsection (e)(1), by striking the last sentence; and

(4) in subsection (k)--

(A) by redesignating paragraphs (5) and (6) as paragraphs (7) and (8), respectively; and

(B) by inserting after paragraph (4) the following new paragraphs:

`(5) TRANSNATIONAL ORGANIZED CRIME- The term `transnational organized crime' means--

`(A) racketeering activity (as such term is defined in section 1961 of title 18, United States Code) that involves at least one jurisdiction outside the United States; or

`(B) any other criminal offense punishable by a term of imprisonment of at least four years under Federal, State, or local law that involves at least one jurisdiction outside the United States and that is intended to obtain, directly or indirectly, a financial or other material benefit.

`(6) TRANSNATIONAL ORGANIZED CRIME GROUP- The term `transnational organized crime group' means a group of persons that includes one or more citizens of a foreign country, exists for a period of time, and acts in concert with the aim of engaging in transnational organized crime.'.

(b) Rule of Construction- Nothing in this section or the amendments made by this section shall be construed as authorizing the use of any activity precluded under the American Servicemembers' Protection Act of 2002 (Public Law 107-206).

SEC. 112. ESTABLISHMENT OF A WESTERN HEMISPHERE REGIONAL COORDINATION CENTER.

(a) Statement of Policy- It shall be the policy of the United States to--

(1) carry out a comprehensive and integrated approach to United States counterterrorism, counternarcotics, and nonproliferation efforts, both domestically and abroad; and

(2) seek to engage leaders of the governments of countries in the Western Hemisphere to develop a comprehensive multilateral strategy to counter current and emerging threats and prevent the proliferation of nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons.

(b) Purpose- A Western Hemisphere Regional Coordination Center shall serve as a joint operational facility dedicated to coordinating efforts, capacity, and intelligence among participating countries to counter current and emerging threats and prevent the proliferation of nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons throughout the Western Hemisphere.

(c) Establishment- The Secretary of State shall negotiate with the leaders of the governments of other countries of the Western Hemisphere on a bilateral or multilateral basis, as appropriate, international agreements under which such governments work in partnership to establish a center to be known as the `Western Hemisphere Regional Coordination Center' (RCC).

(d) Participation of United States Government Agencies-

(1) IN GENERAL- The Secretary of State, in consultation with the Director of National Intelligence and the Secretary of Defense, shall determine which departments and agencies of the United States Government, including the Department of Defense, the Department of Energy, the Department of Homeland Security, the Department of the Treasury, the Department of Justice, the Drug Enforcement Administration, and the Federal Bureau of Investigation, are necessary to ensure the establishment and operation of the RCC. The Secretary of State, in consultation with the Director of National Intelligence and the Secretary of Defense, shall negotiate agreements with the heads of such agencies to ensure their full participation and cooperation in such establishment and operation.

(2) ASSIGNMENT OF REGIONAL ATTACHES AND ADVISORS- The Secretary of State, in coordination with the Secretary of Defense and the Director of National Intelligence, may transfer to the RCC regional attaches and advisors serving at United States diplomatic and consular missions in the Western Hemisphere.

(e) Structure-

(1) MANAGEMENT OF THE RCC- It is the sense of Congress that the Secretary of State, in coordination with the Secretary of Defense and the Director of National Intelligence, should be responsible for the management of the RCC, including development of the budget, priorities, and programs of the RCC.

(2) STAFFING AND DUTIES-

(A) IN GENERAL- The RCC shall have one United States Director, at least one but not more than two United States Deputy Directors, and one host country General Director. The United States Director and United States Deputy Directors may be employees of any of the United States national security agencies and shall be chosen by the Secretary of State, in consultation with the Director of National Intelligence and Secretary of Defense. The Director and Deputy Directors of the RCC shall keep the Chief of Mission of the United States Embassy in the host country of the RCC fully informed of activities and operations of such RCC.

(B) STAFF OF FOREIGN COUNTRIES- It is the sense of Congress that the Secretary of State should seek to ensure that staff of the RCC who are representatives of governments of other countries of the Western Hemisphere are comprised of individuals who are members of vetted units of such governments that are approved by the United States Government.

(f) United States Contributions- The United States should contribute existing funds, personnel, and other resources to the RCC in order to avoid duplicative efforts to maximize the presence of the United States to improve regional security and cooperation within the Western Hemisphere.

SEC. 113. TRANSFER OF FUNDS TO THE CENTRAL AMERICAN REGIONAL SECURITY INITIATIVE.

For fiscal year 2013 and each subsequent fiscal year, 50 percent of the amount of funds made available for `Development Assistance' to carry out environmental programs and 50 percent of the amount of funds made available for the Global Climate Change Fund for the Western Hemisphere may be transferred to, and merged with, funds made available for `International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement' to carry out the Central American Regional Security Initiative.

SEC. 114. ADMINISTRATION OF SECURITY ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS FOR CENTRAL AMERICAN COUNTRIES.

(a) Findings- Congress finds the following:

(1) According to the Government Accountability Office report dated July 2010 regarding the Merida Initiative, Department of State officials at posts in Central American countries expressed frustration with the Narcotics Affairs Section (NAS) of the United States Embassy in Mexico City serving as the account manager for International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement funds destined for Central America because `it adds an extra layer' to an already complex funding process.

(2) Some Department of State officials at posts in Central America stated that this situation has created a bottleneck on the progress of bilateral procurement and training.

(3) United States officials at posts in three Central American countries noted that returning funds to embassy control would speed up procurement, and facilitate travel, training, and exchange programs.

(b) Requirement- For fiscal year 2013 and each subsequent fiscal year, funds made available for `International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement' to carry out security assistance programs for any country of Central America may be administered only through the United States embassy for such Central American country.

SEC. 115. RESTRICTION ON ASSISTANCE FOR THE GUATEMALAN ARMY.

(a) In General- Not later than 120 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a report that narrowly defines Guatemala's strategy for addressing--

(1) border security and external threats;

(2) respect for human rights;

(3) cooperation with civilian investigations and prosecutions of cases involving current and retired officers and with the International Commission against Impunity in Guatemala (CICIG); and

(4) public disclosure of all military archives pertaining to the internal armed conflict.

(b) Appropriate Congressional Committees Defined- In this section, the term `appropriate congressional committees' means--

(1) the Committee on Foreign Affairs and the Committee on Appropriations of the House of Representatives; and

(2) the Committee on Foreign Relations and the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate.

TITLE II--NONPROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR, CHEMICAL, AND BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS IN THE WESTERN HEMISPHERE

SEC. 201. FINDINGS.

Congress finds the following:

(1) Venezuela and Iran have established extensive political, military, and economic cooperation.

(2) Venezuela, under the government of Hugo Chavez, has publicly supported Iran's development of a capacity to enrich uranium, which many observers believe is part of a nuclear weapons program.

(3) In May 2005, Chavez stated that he was seeking assistance from Iran to establish a nuclear program in Venezuela.

(4) On February 4, 2006, Venezuela was one of only three countries to vote against a resolution by the Board of Governors of the International Atomic Energy Agency, or IAEA, to report Iran to the United Nations Security Council for violating its obligations under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.

(5) On February 15, 2006, the Speaker of the Iranian parliament, Gholam Ali Haddad-Adel, stated that his government was prepared to discuss providing technical assistance to a Venezuelan nuclear program.

(6) On a visit to Iran in February 2008, Abel El Zabayar, a member of Venezuela's National Assembly and Mining Commission, stated that Iran will `practically give away' its civilian nuclear technology and that `if relations with Iran lead to sharing nuclear technology with us, we would then give it away to our brothers in Latin America once we are successful.'.

(7) El Zabayar stated that Venezuela had taken steps toward establishing a civilian nuclear program and that cooperation in this area was being discussed with the Governments of Iran and Belarus.

(8) Venezuela reportedly has large deposits of uranium ore in the Guiana Shield region.

(9) In October 2009 Hugo Chavez stated Venezuela was `working with several countries, with Iran, with Russia' in their exploration for uranium.

(10) In December 2009, Iran and Ecuador signed a mining agreement that establishes a framework for potential uranium cooperation.

(11) In 1985 the Brazilian government announced that it had terminated a clandestine nuclear weapons program run by the military since 1975.

(12) In August 2005 a former high-ranking Brazilian nuclear official stated that the military had continued to develop elements of a nuclear weapons program into the 1990s.

(13) On November 20, 2007, Brazilian General Jose Benedito de Barros Moreira publicly called for Brazil to develop the technological capacity to manufacture nuclear weapons.

(14) The centrifuges at Brazil's Resende uranium enrichment plant can be reconfigured to produce highly enriched uranium in quantities sufficient to produce several nuclear weapons annually.

(15) Brazil has denied inspectors from the IAEA full access to its uranium enrichment centrifuges at Resende on the grounds that it is protecting commercial secrets.

(16) The standoff with the IAEA was resolved only by the IAEA agreeing to limit its verification methods to indirect inspections without direct inspection of the centrifuges, which many nonproliferation experts fear could be used as a precedent by Iran and other countries to prevent IAEA inspectors from examining their suspect nuclear facilities.

(17) A prototype nuclear reactor is being developed at the Armar Research Center for use in Brazil's nuclear-powered submarine program.

(18) On February 24, 2008, the Governments of Argentina and Brazil agreed to begin negotiations regarding the joint development of a nuclear reactor and construction of a uranium enrichment plant.

(19) In February 2008, President Christina Kirchner of Argentina and Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva of Brazil agreed to the establishment of a joint uranium enrichment plant.

(20) In 2010 Brazil facilitated a joint declaration for Iran to send uranium to Turkey for enrichment. After the announcement, Brazilian Foreign Minister Celso Amorin stated `in our view, the agreement eliminates any ground for sanctions against Iran.'.

(21) In 2011 Brazil expanded its uranium enrichment capacity to an industrial level.

(22) Until 1990 the Argentine Government conducted a clandestine nuclear weapons program.

(23) In December 1985 Argentina and Iran signed a nuclear cooperation agreement in which Argentina agreed to supply Iran with highly enriched uranium.

(24) In 1987 and 1988 Argentina signed three agreements with Iran for converting a nuclear reactor to use enriched uranium, for building pilot plants for uranium-dioxide conversion and fuel fabrication.

(25) Assistance by Argentina to the Iranian nuclear program was reduced, but not terminated, following pressure by the United States.

(26) Several countries in Latin America, including Brazil and Argentina, have not signed and implemented an Additional Protocol which provides IAEA inspectors with enhanced access to nuclear facilities.

(27) Some Western Hemisphere countries have not ratified the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on their Destruction, also referred to as The Chemical Weapons Convention.

(28) Several countries in Latin America have not signed and ratified The Convention on the Prohibition of the Development and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on their Destruction (also referred to as the Biological Weapons Convention).

SEC. 202. STATEMENT OF POLICY REGARDING THE PROLIFERATION OF WEAPONS-RELATED NUCLEAR, CHEMICAL, AND BIOLOGICAL MATERIALS, TECHNOLOGY, AND FACILITIES.

(a) In General- To enhance the prevention of the proliferation of weapons-related nuclear, chemical, and biological materials, technology, and facilities, it shall be the policy of the United States to--

(1) promote the negotiation and implementation by all countries of--

(A) a comprehensive safeguards agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA); and

(B) an Additional Protocol to the safeguards agreement;

(2) secure guarantees by all countries of unrestricted access by IAEA personnel to all nuclear-related materials and facilities in territories under the control of the host country;

(3) promote the implementation by all countries of United Nations Security Council Resolution 1540 which was amended on April 20, 2011, by United Nations Security Council Resolution 1977 and which reaffirms that the proliferation of nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons and their means of delivery constitutes a threat to international peace and security, and extends the mandate of the Resolution 1540 Committee for a period of 10 years to 2021;

(4) promote the accession to and ratification and implementation of--

(A) the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on their Destruction (also referred to as the Chemical Weapons Convention);

(B) the 1980 IAEA Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material;

(D) the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on their Destruction (also referred to as the Biological Weapons Convention).

(b) Additional Protocol Defined- In this section, the term `Additional Protocol' means the Protocol Additional to an agreement between a country and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards.

SEC. 203. STATEMENT OF POLICY REGARDING THE SMALL QUANTITIES PROTOCOL.

(a) In General- Because a Small Quantities Protocol (SQP) sets aside many of the operative provisions of a general safeguards agreement, the ability of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to verify that nuclear materials and facilities in a country with an SQP are not being diverted for illicit purposes is significantly impaired. For this reason, it shall be the policy of the United States to--

(1) oppose the negotiation by the IAEA of an SQP for any country that did not have an SQP as of January 1, 2012; and

(2) encourage every country with an SQP to withdraw formally from or renegotiate that agreement for the purpose of increasing transparency and eliminating any exemption or provision that could restrict the ability of the IAEA to verify that a country's nuclear materials and facilities are not being diverted to impermissible uses.

(b) Countries Described- For purposes of subsection (a)(1), as of January 1, 2012, the countries with an SQP are the following: Antigua & Barbuda, Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, Bolivia, Costa Rica, Dominica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Grenada, Guatemala, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, St. Kitts and Nevis, St. Lucia, St. Vincent and the Grenadines, Suriname, Trinidad & Tobago, and the United States.

SEC. 204. SECURING ADHERENCE TO AGREEMENTS REGARDING NUCLEAR NONPROLIFERATION BY COUNTRIES IN THE WESTERN HEMISPHERE.

(a) In General- The President shall use all available political, economic, and diplomatic tools to ensure that each country in the Western Hemisphere--

(1) has signed and implemented a comprehensive safeguards agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA);

(2) has signed and implemented an Additional Protocol to its safeguards agreement;

(3) guarantees unrestricted access for IAEA personnel to all nuclear-related facilities;

(4) has implemented the provisions of United Nations Security Council Resolution 1540;

(5) has acceded to, ratified, and fully implemented the conventions referred to in section 202(a)(4);

(6) does not negotiate with the IAEA an SQP if that country did not have an SQP as of January 1, 2012; and

(7) withdraws formally from or renegotiates an SQP agreement if a country has such an agreement.

(b) Sanctions- For any Western Hemisphere country that has not satisfied all of the requirements specified in subsection (a), the President is authorized to--

(1) suspend United States nonhumanitarian foreign assistance to the government of that country; and

(A) the Export Administration Act of 1979 (as continued in effect under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act);

(B) the Arms Export Control Act;

(D) any other statute that requires the prior review and approval of the United States Government as a condition for the export or re-export of goods or services.

SEC. 205. HALTING THE PROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR FUEL FABRICATION.

(a) Statement of Policy- It shall be the policy of the United States to oppose the development or acquisition by any country of a capacity to fabricate nuclear fuel if such country did not have such capacity as of January 1, 2012.

(b) Prevention of Capacity To Fabricate Nuclear Fuel- The President shall use all available political, economic, and diplomatic tools, and shall use the voice, vote, and influence of the United States in all international organizations and associations of which it is a member, including the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and the Nuclear Suppliers Group, to prevent the development or acquisition by any country of a capacity to fabricate nuclear fuel if such country did not have such capacity as of January 1, 2012.

(c) Nuclear Technical Cooperation With the IAEA- The President shall direct the United States Permanent Representative to the IAEA to use the voice, vote, and influence of the United States at the IAEA to block the allocation of funds for any IAEA development, environmental, or nuclear science assistance or activity to a country the government of which--

(1) the Secretary of State has determined, for purposes of section 6(j) of the Export Administration Act of 1979 (as continued in effect under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act), section 620A of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, section 40 of the Arms Export Control Act, or any other provision of law, is a government that has repeatedly provided support for acts of international terrorism;

(2) is actively cooperating with a government as described in paragraph (1);

(3) is under investigation for a breach of or noncompliance with its IAEA obligations or the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations; or

(4) is in violation of its IAEA obligations or the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations.

SEC. 206. COOPERATION WITH THE PROLIFERATION SECURITY INITIATIVE.

(a) Findings- Congress finds the following:

(1) From its inception on May 31, 2003, the Proliferation Security Initiative, also referred to as the PSI, has repeatedly demonstrated its effectiveness in preventing the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.

(2) In his February 11, 2004, address at the National Defense University regarding additional measures to enhance global efforts against the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction President Bush proposed that `the work of the Proliferation Security Initiative be expanded to address more than shipments and transfers. Building on the tools we've developed to fight terrorists, we can take direct action against proliferation networks. We need greater cooperation not just among intelligence and military services, but in law enforcement, as well. PSI participants and other willing nations should use the Interpol and all other means to bring to justice those who traffic in deadly weapons, to shut down their labs, to seize their materials, to freeze their assets. We must act on every lead. We will find the middlemen, the suppliers and the buyers.'.

(3) The number of countries participating in PSI has steadily increased, thereby greatly enhancing its effectiveness.

(4) Many countries in the Western Hemisphere formally or informally cooperate with the PSI.

(5) Expanded law enforcement cooperation throughout the Western Hemisphere, including by means of greater coordination of policies, improved communications, and enhanced capabilities would significantly promote the objectives of the PSI.

(b) Sense of Congress Concerning Strengthening Cooperation Regarding Nonproliferation- It is the sense of Congress that--

(1) it is in the national security interest of the United States to establish comprehensive cooperation to prevent the proliferation of nuclear, chemical, and biological materials in the Western Hemisphere; and

(2) the Secretary of State should seek to secure the formal or informal cooperation by Western Hemisphere countries for the purpose of securing the goals of the Proliferation Security Initiative announced by the President on May 31, 2003.

SEC. 207. ESTABLISHMENT OF THE WESTERN HEMISPHERE NONPROLIFERATION PARTNERSHIP INITIATIVE.

(a) In General- The Secretary of State is authorized, in consultation with relevant United States Government agencies, to negotiate with the leaders of the governments of countries in the Western Hemisphere on a bilateral or multilateral basis, as appropriate, international agreements under which such governments work in partnership to establish an initiative to be known as the `Western Hemisphere Nonproliferation Partnership Initiative' (NPI).

(b) Purpose-

(1) IN GENERAL- The NPI shall--

(A) encourage the establishment of contacts and cooperative relationships, including the sharing of intelligence, between the responsible individuals and agencies of each participant country with their counterparts in the United States Government and in other participating countries; and

(B) encourage bilateral and multilateral support, cooperation, and coordination of national programs and efforts to promote effective and in-depth cooperation to counter the illicit acquisition or trade of weapons-related nuclear, chemical, or biological materials, technology, or facilities.

(2) COOPERATIVE PROGRAMS- The cooperative programs referred to under paragraph (1)(B) shall include the following:

(A) Training for government officials and agents from participating countries regarding the development and operation of NPI programs.

(B) Assistance in developing a comprehensive legal and regulatory framework in each country, as appropriate, to enable the establishment and effective implementation of export controls and the capacity to track nuclear, chemical, and biological materials, equipment, technology, and facilities.

(C) Provision of equipment, development of infrastructure, and the acquisition of other resources required by participating countries to effectively carry out the tasks referred to in subparagraphs (A) and (B).

SEC. 208. FOREIGN POLICY CONTROLS.

(a) Terrorist States- Section 6(j)(4) of the Export Administration Act of 1979 (50 U.S.C. App. 2405(j)(4)) is amended--

(1) in the matter preceding subparagraph (A), by striking `the Speaker' and inserting `the chairman of the Committee on Foreign Affairs'; and

(2) in subparagraph (B)--

(A) in clause (i), by striking `6-month period; and' and inserting `36-month period;';

(B) in clause (ii), by striking the period at the end and inserting a semicolon; and

`(iii) that government is not a `country of proliferation concern' as defined in section 1055(g)(2) of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010 (50 U.S.C. 2371(g)(2)); and

`(iv) that government has provided assurances that it will not knowingly facilitate, directly or indirectly, the proliferation of nuclear materials, items, or technology in the future.'.

(b) Conforming Amendments-

(1) FOREIGN ASSISTANCE ACT OF 1961- Section 620A(c) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2371(c)) is amended--

(A) in the matter preceding paragraph (1), by striking `the Speaker' and inserting `the chairman of the Committee on Foreign Affairs'; and

(B) in paragraph (2)--

(i) in subparagraph (A), by striking `6-month period; and' and inserting `36-month period;';

(ii) in subparagraph (B), by striking the period at the end and inserting a semicolon; and

(iii) by adding after subparagraph (B) the following:

`(C) that government is not a `country of proliferation concern' as defined in section 1055(g)(2) of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010 (50 U.S.C. 2371(g)(2)); and

`(D) that government has provided assurances that it will not knowingly facilitate, directly or indirectly, the proliferation of nuclear materials, items, or technology in the future.'.

(2) ARMS EXPORT CONTROL ACT- Section 40(f)(1) of the Arms Export Control Act (22 U.S.C. 2780(f)(1)) is amended--

(A) in the matter preceding subparagraph (A), by striking `the Speaker' and inserting `the chairman of the Committee on Foreign Affairs'; and

(B) in subparagraph (B)--

(i) in clause (i), by striking `6-month period; and' and inserting `36-month period;';

(ii) in clause (ii), by striking the period at the end and inserting a semicolon;

(iii) by adding after clause (ii) the following:

`(iii) that government is not a `country of proliferation concern' as defined in section 1055(g)(2) of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010 (50 U.S.C. 2371(g)(2)); and

`(iv) that government has provided assurances that it will not knowingly facilitate, directly or indirectly, the proliferation of nuclear materials, items, or technology in the future.'.

SEC. 209. LIMITATION ON ARMS TRANSFERS.

(a) In General- No letter of offer to sell major defense equipment to a foreign government of the Western Hemisphere may be issued pursuant to the Arms Export Control Act (22 U.S.C. 2751 et seq.) and no license to export major defense equipment to a foreign government of the Western Hemisphere may be issued pursuant to such Act in a fiscal year until the President makes the certification required under subsection (b) for such fiscal year.

(b) Certification- The certification required by this section is a certification by the President that the foreign government of the Western Hemisphere--

(1) is not carrying out policies aimed at undermining United States national security interests; and

(2) is cooperating fully with United States nonproliferation efforts.

(c) Waiver- The President may waive the prohibition under subsection (b) with respect to a specific transaction if the President determines that such transaction is important to the national security interests of the United States.

SEC. 210. RESTRICTIONS ON NUCLEAR COOPERATION WITH COUNTRIES ASSISTING THE NUCLEAR PROGRAM OF VENEZUELA OR CUBA.

(a) In General- Notwithstanding any other provision of law or any international agreement, no agreement for cooperation between the United States and the government of any country that is assisting the nuclear or biological program of Venezuela or Cuba or transferring advanced conventional weapons or missiles to Venezuela or Cuba may be submitted to the President or to Congress pursuant to section 123 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (42 U.S.C. 2153), no such agreement may enter into force with such country, no license may be issued for export directly or indirectly to such country of any nuclear material, facilities, components, or other goods, services, or technology that would be subject to such agreement, and no approval may be given for the transfer or retransfer directly or indirectly to such country of any nuclear material, facilities, components, or other goods, services, or technology that would be subject to such agreement, until the President determines and reports to the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives and the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate that the government of the country that is assisting the nuclear program of Venezuela or Cuba or transferring advanced conventional weapons or missiles to Venezuela or Cuba--

(1) has suspended all nuclear assistance to Venezuela or Cuba and all transfers of advanced conventional weapons and missiles to Venezuela or Cuba; and

(2) is committed to maintaining such suspension until Venezuela or Cuba has implemented measures that would permit the President to make the determination described in paragraph (1).

(b) Rules of Construction- The restrictions described in subsection (a)--

(1) shall apply in addition to all other applicable procedures, requirements, and restrictions required by the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 and any other law; and

(2) shall not be construed as affecting the validity of agreements for cooperation that are in effect on the date of the enactment of this Act.

(1) AGREEMENT FOR COOPERATION- The term `agreement for cooperation' has the meaning given that term in section 11 b. of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (42 U.S.C. 2014 b.).

(2) ASSISTING THE NUCLEAR PROGRAM OF VENEZUELA OR CUBA- The term `assisting the nuclear program of Venezuela or Cuba' means the intentional transfer to Venezuela or Cuba by a government, or by a person subject to the jurisdiction of a government with the knowledge and acquiescence of such government, of goods, services, or technology listed on the Nuclear Suppliers Group Guidelines for the Export of Nuclear Material, Equipment and Technology (published by the International Atomic Energy Agency as Information Circular INFCIRC/254/Rev. 3/Part 1, and subsequent revisions) or Guidelines for Transfers of Nuclear-Related Dual-Use Equipment, Material, and Related Technology (published by the International Atomic Energy Agency as Information Circular INFCIR/254/Rev. 3/Part 2, and subsequent revisions).

(3) COUNTRY THAT IS ASSISTING THE NUCLEAR PROGRAM OF VENEZUELA OR CUBA OR TRANSFERRING ADVANCED CONVENTIONAL WEAPONS OR MISSILES TO VENEZUELA OR CUBA- The term `country that is assisting the nuclear program of Venezuela or Cuba or transferring advanced conventional weapons or missiles to Venezuela or Cuba' means--

(A) Russia; and

(B) any other country determined by the President to be assisting the nuclear program of Venezuela or Cuba or transferring advanced conventional weapons or missiles to Venezuela or Cuba.

(4) TRANSFERRING ADVANCED CONVENTIONAL WEAPONS OR MISSILES TO VENEZUELA OR CUBA- The term `transferring advanced conventional weapons or missiles to Venezuela or Cuba' means the intentional transfer to Venezuela or Cuba by a government, or by a person subject to the jurisdiction of a government with the knowledge and acquiescence of such government, of goods, services, or technology listed on--

(A) the Wassenaar Arrangement list of Dual Use Goods and Technologies and Munitions list of July 12, 1996, and subsequent revisions; or

(B) the Missile Technology Control Regime Equipment and Technology Annex of June 11, 1996, and subsequent revisions.

TITLE III--ORGANIZATION OF AMERICAN STATES

SEC. 301. ACTIONS REGARDING THE ORGANIZATION OF AMERICAN STATES.

(a) Declaration Regarding Terrorism- The Secretary of State shall direct the United States Representative to the Organization of American States (OAS) to use the voice, vote, and influence of the United States at the OAS to move for a declaration at the first meeting of Member States of the OAS convened after the date of the enactment of this Act calling on countries to systematically deny the use of their territories by terrorists or terrorist organizations.

(b) Transfer of Funds for United States Voluntary Contributions to the OAS-

(1) IN GENERAL- For fiscal year 2013 and each subsequent fiscal year, 50 percent of the amount of funds made available for United States assessed contributions to the OAS may be transferred to, and merged with, funds made available for United States voluntary contributions to the OAS.

(2) USE OF FUNDS-

(A) IN GENERAL- For fiscal year 2013 and each subsequent fiscal year, it is the sense of Congress that the United States Representative to the OAS should allocate funds made available for United States voluntary contributions to the OAS so as to give priority to contributions to the organizations specified in subparagraph (B).

(B) ORGANIZATIONS SPECIFIED- The organizations referred to in subparagraph (A) are the following:

(i) The OAS Inter-American Committee Against Terrorism (CICTE).

(ii) The OAS Inter-American Drug Abuse Control Commission (CICAD).

(iii) The OAS Fund for Strengthening Democracy.

(iv) The Inter-American Commission on Human Rights.

(1) IN GENERAL- No contributions by the United States may be made to the OAS if Cuba is admitted as an active Member State to the OAS or participates at the Summit of the Americas with the consent of the OAS unless the Secretary of State determines and certifies to the appropriate congressional committees that a democratically elected government in Cuba has been established.

(2) DEFINITION- In this subsection, the term `democratically elected government in Cuba', in addition to meeting the requirements of section 205(a) of the Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity (LIBERTAD) Act of 1996 (22 U.S.C. 6065(a)), means a government which meets the requirements of section 206 of such Act (22 U.S.C. 6066).

TITLE IV--MISCELLANEOUS PROVISIONS

SEC. 401. PROHIBITIONS ON ENGAGEMENT WITH CERTAIN WESTERN HEMISPHERE COUNTRIES.

Nothing in this Act shall be construed as weakening or removing any prohibitions on United States engagement with or assistance to any country in the Western Hemisphere that the Secretary of State has designated as a state sponsor of terrorism for a minimum of five consecutive years.

SEC. 402. REPORT.

(a) In General- For each of the fiscal years 2013, 2014, and 2015, the Secretary of State shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a report on the activities carried out to achieve the objectives described in titles I and II that describe--

(1) the extent to which each such objective has been achieved;

(2) the steps taken by the United States and countries in the Western Hemisphere in the preceding calendar year to accomplish such objectives;

(3) the extent of cooperation by other countries in the Western Hemisphere toward achieving such objectives; and

(4) the steps the United States will take in the current calendar year to accomplish such objectives.

(b) Preparation and Form of Report- The report required under subsection (a) shall rely on public information to the extent possible, and may include a classified annex, if necessary.

END

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Western Hemisphere Security Cooperation Act of 2012