What's happening in Colombia's armed forces?

Latin America and the Caribbean
Gen. Gustavo Matamoros at his farewell press conference (source: Semana magazine).

A few days before Easter, with the approval of President Juan Manuel Santos, Defense Minister Rodrigo Rivera abruptly fired (or “accepted the resignation of”) the number-two officer in Colombia’s armed forces. As chairman of Colombia’s Joint Chiefs of Staff (Estado Mayor Conjunto), General Gustavo Matamoros was outranked only by armed forces chief Édgar Cely, a navy admiral, and was thus the highest-ranking active member of Colombia’s Army.

Gen. Matamoros, a frequent visitor to the United States, reacted angrily to his dismissal. Asked whether it resulted from divisions in the Colombian military’s high command, he responded, “If there weren’t any [divisions], these decisions wouldn’t have been made. This is a direct attack on the Army. They are finishing it off [Lo están acabando.].”

On April 27 Gen. Matamoros, now out of uniform, held a press conference for which he had promised to explain the reason for his exit. In the end, though, the now-retired general did not give a reason. He left it up to Defense Minister Rivera to explain it. Matamoros blamed the defense minister for the “notorous fall that the troops have suffered in the past few months,” adding, “These are not the Army’s most fortunate hours. It is obvious that something very serious is happening.”

But what is happening? It is always difficult to know how fractures and factionaisms are playing out within Colombia’s armed forces, an institution that closely guards its prerogatives and is reluctant to air its internal matters in public. But conversations and Colombian media reports reveal a few things.

“It’s said that he [Matamoros] is a cocktail-party general from the country’s military aristocracy. Despite that, they gave him a chance, and the result was that he couldn’t work as part of a team,” an unnamed Defense Ministry source told El Tiempo, Colombia’s most-circulated newspaper. But problems within the high command appear to have been even broader than that, and to have dragged on for months.

Colombia’s Semana newsmagazine reported that Defense Minister Rivera had organized two sessions, in late February and early March, in which psychologists and facilitators sought to get the top military brass to talk out their problems and heal deep divisions. Neither effort succeeded. “In one of the meetings, Admiral Édgar Cely [the armed-forces chief] spoke of how the role of a naval officer at the command of the armed forces was a recurring theme in the Army and in particular for Gen. Matamoros. Meanwhile, a source told Semana, the commander of the Army, Gen. Alejandro Navas, spoke of having disagreements with Matamoros himself.”

“Jointness?”

According to one widely reported set of rumors, which Gen. Matamoros denies, the army general left because he could not bear to follow the command of a naval officer. (Colombia’s Army is more than six times larger than its Navy.) “In the hallways of the Defense Ministry,” wrote Semana a few days before Gen. Matamoros’ exit,

it is an open secret that some sectors, especially in the Army, disliked the government’s choice to name a naval officer. … “Many Army generals, some prodded by groups of retired officers, have simply chosen not to obey Cely. They don’t respect him and don’t view him as a leader,” an Army general who asked not to reveal his identity told Semana. Many of those interviewed pointed to the role of Cely’s second-in-command, Gen. Gustavo Matamoros, in these frictions. He categorically denies it.

Human Rights?

According to some speculation, the Army’s response to human rights allegations has also been a point of worsening internal division. The same Semana piece, written before Gen. Matamoros’s dismissal, says:

Nor is it a secret that there are tensions in the Army between one sector that rose within a tradition of scarce respect for human rights, which sees conspiracies behind every scandal affecting the institution’s “bad apples,” and other, more modern sectors who have become convinced that human rights violations reduce the institution’s legitimacy and do it irreparable harm. Both sectors have their representatives among the high command and among the association of retired generals, and their relations are not smooth.

Divisions over human rights worsened with the grave revelations of “false positives” – thousands of civilians allegedly murdered by soldiers and falsely presented as armed-group members killed in combat – and more recent scandals like the comfortable “resort” conditions for imprisoned military human rights violators. Recent verdicts against top retired officers for old cases have worsened tensions further.

The situation has deteriorated to such a point that, some speculate, some officers are refusing to carry out operations because of the rather tiny likelihood that they will be accused of human rights abuses while performing their duties.

Where Gen. Matamoros fits on the armed forces’ human rights spectrum is unclear. After his resignation, though, he took a very hard line in a radio interview.

For the soldiers it is significant that every time that something happens in which a bandit is killed with a weapon, they have to stop to give a statement about it. In the military war the FARC have no chance of winning, … but the “political war” is a big problem. … They [the guerrillas] get people to infiltrate government institutions in order to change people’s minds and hearts. The FARC have planned it intelligently. … There are cases in which testimonies [about abuses] come from infiltrated bandits. Many of our people are in trouble with the justice system because of false testimonies.

Corruption?

There is a set of rumors that Gen. Matamoros does not deny, but about which he offers no details. As El Tiempo put it, “Military sources say that the discord with Gen. Matamoros has to do with supposed irregularities that he found in several contracts executed by the Army and the General Command.”

According to this narrative, Gen. Matamoros was in charge of some internal corruption investigations that found serious malfeasance in contracts involving top current or former military leaders. “Something very serious is happening,” Matamoros hinted at his farewell press conference, calling on Defense Minister Rivera to reveal the apparent contracting irregularities.

“Matamoros was carrying out a vital fight against internal corruption in the Army,” wrote conservative columnist Rafael Nieto in Medellín’s El Colombiano. “Many problems have been inherited and dishonest generals, now retired, still have excessive influence. They viewed with fear the possibility of Matamoros’ arrival in the high command, not only because past rackets would be revealed, but also because it would end those that, with their participation, are still going on.”

If this set of rumors is correct, Gen. Matamoros’ firing effectively squashes these corruption investigations.

Whatever the reason – failure to work jointly, human rights divisions, corruption allegations, all of the above, or something else – Gen. Matamoros’ exit indicates an armed force that is badly distracted by internal feuds at a time when Colombia’s internal security situation is either stagnating or worsening. Colombia still faces an internal armed conflict, and many indicators are going in the wrong direction.

The FARC guerrillas and especially the bandas criminales or “new” paramilitary groups have been attacking both military and civilian targets more frequently. Urban violent crime is rising amid a strong general perception that citizen security is worsening (68 percent of respondents said so in the most recent Gallup poll). The impression that the security forces are too distracted by internal feuds to face these challenges could carry a high political cost for President Santos.

In particular, it may mean that time is running out for Colombia’s embattled defense minister, Rodrigo Rivera. A career politician with little defense experience, Rivera could soon be shown the exit.