On the Way Toward a Successful Security Architecture for the Jordan Valley
On Saturday, February 1, Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud Abbas voiced support for a proposal that would create a United States-led NATO force to police and secure the Jordan Valley as part of a negotiated peace deal between Israel and the Palestinians. The proposal comes amidst reports that U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry will pitch a “framework” for further negotiations in the upcoming weeks. So far, the fate of the Jordan Valley, a 15 mile wide, Israeli-controlled strip of land which runs along the West Bank’s border with the Jordan River, remains one of the most contentious issues between the two sides. Reports indicate that Israel is deliberating on the extent of any military withdrawal from the valley, while Palestinian leaders insist on no more than a five-year, geographically limited Israeli military presence.
The valley has been controlled by Israel since 1967, despite several attempts by the two sides to reach a final agreement on the territory’s status. The Oslo Accords, first signed in 1993, called for a gradual withdrawal of Israeli troops from the territory, but they were never fully implemented. To this day, Israeli troops, joined by a growing number of Israeli settlers, remain in the valley. In 2007, during negotiations between then Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert and President Abbas, the two leaders reportedly reached an agreement on the fate of the Jordan Valley, with Israel willing to relinquish control in exchange for full security cooperation between Israel, neighboring Jordan and the Palestinians (though no details were ever released).
Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and his governing coalition were quick to distance themselves from any proposed plans former Prime Minister Olmert may or may not have discussed with President Abbas. But since negotiations began last year, Israeli fears that Netanyahu will cede control of the Jordan Valley have led to the recycling of many arguments regarding its future status. The Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs, a policy think tank headed by former Netanyahu foreign affairs advisor Dore Gold, released a lengthy report on the strategic value of the Jordan Valley. The report stresses the geographic importance of the valley as a front line of defense against potential threats from the East and as a forward base of operations against terrorist infiltration. But this strategic rationale is not unanimous. Several reputable Israeli sources have come out against the proposition that Israel must remain in the valley under any circumstances.
The Palestinians see the Jordan Valley, which amounts to close to a quarter of the West Bank’s land, as an indispensable part of their future state, and as such reject a longstanding presence on the territory by Israel. And as President Abbas maintains, in addition to existing close collaboration between Israeli and Palestinian security forces, the Palestinians have agreed that a future Palestinian state will not have its own army, saying, “[w]e will be demilitarized. . . . Do you think we have any illusion that we can have any security if the Israelis do not feel they have security?”
To try and bridge the gap between the Israeli and Palestinian positions on security arrangements in the West Bank, and in the Jordan Valley more specifically, President Obama appointed retired four-star Marine Corps Gen. John R. Allen, former commander of NATO forces in Afghanistan, to formulate a “made-in-America security solution” as stated by analyst Geoffrey Aronson. The proposal was meant to “balance Israel’s security needs and the Palestinian demand for maximum sovereignty over the territory of the future Palestinian state.”
Early speculation on the content of the proposal had it that Allen would try and assuage Israel by suggesting a “redeployment of the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) behind recognized borders and the creation of a third-party monitoring presence.” This, in effect, would mean no Israeli troops on the Jordan River crossings between Jordan and the future Palestinian state or an Israeli military presence further inland in the valley itself. In addition, a third-party would be responsible for monitoring the border in order to allay the mistrust between Israelis and Palestinians. But as discussions intensified, the U.S. team, composed of 160 security specialists and diplomats, incorporated many Israeli demands.
The final details of the Allen plan reportedly included the following provisions:
1. An offer by the U.S. to monitor both the border and the Palestinian pledge not to militarize their internal security forces, using drones and other advanced technological tools.
2. Joint Israeli-Palestinian control over Jordan River crossings, possibly with a U.S. presence.
3. Evacuation of Israeli military forces from most of the West Bank.
4. U.S. willingness to invest billions of dollars in Israel’s military and intelligence capabilities
Another source maintains the proposal included an Israeli military presence along a prominent Israeli highway located five kilometers inland from the Jordan River.
Both Israel and the Palestinians are said to have rejected these terms. Israel thought the security proposal was not strong enough and the Palestinians objected to the large presence of Israeli forces on their future sovereign land.
The Kerry framework is the latest comprehensive U.S. proposal upon which the Israelis and Palestinians will have to decide whether or not to continue their negotiations. The framework largely follows the recommendations laid down by Allen while emphasizing the potential involvement of a third party and the need for a transition period between current Israeli control and future Palestinian sovereignty. It reportedly contains provisions for a security zone along the Jordan River which will be monitored by a third party, without a robust Israeli presence further inland from the river. The area is already full of high-tech and early warning security stations, and Kerry’s proposal would build on this infrastructure with a series of technological measures such as “smart fences” and drones. Kerry envisions Israeli forces policing this zone for ten years. Abbas has said he could tolerate a five year presence, but Israel is not receptive to the idea of an agreed upon withdrawal date.
In this context, Abbas’ new proposal aims to both guarantee the West Bank’s security and to avoid the possibility of a long-term Israeli military presence. Abbas said NATO forces could stay for “a long time, and wherever they want. . . . They can stay to reassure the Israelis, and to protect us.” The Israelis, meanwhile, remain skeptical of any international force. They point to Lebanon and the Sinai, where international troops have not always been able to maintain security and respond to threats. If Israelis and Palestinians accept the Kerry framework, the aforementioned provisions will set the groundwork for further negotiations on a final deal.