The Ecuadorian military's delayed reaction
Writing in Influencias y Resistencias, a new book about civil-military relations in Latin America, FLACSO-Ecuador analyst Simón Pachano remarks on the Ecuadorian armed forces’ history of high political activity, especially during times of crisis. “[T]he armed forces,” Pachano writes, “have occupied, directly or indirectly, a place of importance on the political scene.” He notes “their participation as actors of last resort during political crises.”
Pachano lays out three ways in which the military has intervened in Ecuadorian politics. One — in which they step in and govern directly — has happened infrequently. The other two, though, are common:
- When the armed forces take a particular faction’s side in a political dispute, and
- When they act as “arbiters during situations that, supposedly or actually, can’t be solved through institutional frameworks. On these occasions they take charge of restoring an order that was momentarily lost, put things back in their places and return power to the civilians.”
Both of Pachano’s categories seem to describe the role that Ecuador’s military played during the events of September 30, when the national police force staged an uprising. The nationally coordinated protests, organized to protest benefit cuts, spiraled into a near-coup, with police holding President Rafael Correa hostage until the army rescued him amid an intense firefight.
As events progressed on September 30, Ecuador’s armed forces ended up siding with a faction — that of constitutionally elected President Rafael Correa, not the police. (Ecuador’s national police are not a branch of the armed forces, nor are they part of the Defense Ministry.) They did so, though, only after a few curious hours of inaction. The Army then acted forcefully as an “arbiter,” “restoring an order that was momentarily lost” by rescuing the president.
While it was the army, along with some elite police agents, who rescued President Correa on the evening of the 30th, there was a several-hour period in which the military’s commitment to constitutional order was less clear. During this period, hundreds of rank-and-file military personnel, especially Air Force members, joined the protests.
It wasn’t until about 2PM — at least 6 hours after the police protests began — that the armed forces chief made a public statement of support for Correa and called for an end to the protests. What happened in the meantime?
By several accounts, the high command withheld support to the government to pressure for repeal of the law cutting police and military benefits. “Before offering his support,” writes Reuters reporter Frank Jack Daniel, “armed forces chief Ernesto Gutiérrez demanded the president reform or annul the controversial public sector law.”
While they did not agree to overturn the law, civilian leaders appear to have entered into a quid pro quo arrangement with the top brass, agreeing to increase their pay in exchange for their support.
Notes Reuters’ Daniel, “Ecuador’s El Comercio newspaper reported that in the midst of Thursday’s protests Defense Minister Javier Ponce met military top brass and promised to deposit money for soldiers’ back pay that had been disputed by the government.” Observes Alberto Acosta, a close Correa confidant turned critic: “When the head of the Joint Command went out and said that the military supported President Correa, in a press conference at 2:00 in the afternoon, he said to the president: ‘Remember, President Correa, that there is still an issue with salaries.’” The next day, adds the Argentine daily Clarín, “The head of the Joint Command, together with the commanders of the Army, Navy and Air Force, met with the minister of defense, Javier Ponce, to ensure that their economic incentives would not be cut.”
A few days later, on October 5, Defense Minister Ponce announced a pay increase for the military and police.
A report from Inter-Press Service contends that Ecuador’s Army leadership was loyal to President Correa, but that the Navy and Air Force were insisting on holding out for economic concessions. “A high-level government source who asked to remain anonymous told IPS that ‘while the army showed loyalty to Correa from the very start, things were more complicated in the other two branches, and it was necessary to negotiate.’”
Ecuador’s armed forces — though not its police — have come out stronger politically in the aftermath of the September 30 uprising. A partial state of emergency continues, with military personnel, not police, guarding the National Assembly and other Quito facilities. “In moments of crisis,” writes Reuters’ Daniel, “the armed forces call the shots in Ecuador. Last week was no exception. … Correa looked vulnerable to Ecuador’s traditional volatility last week and the military could choose to exploit the moment to extract more concessions from him in return for continued support.”
While hundreds of police are under investigation or arrest, it remains unclear whether military personnel who participated in the protests will be sanctioned. This is especially the case for the Ecuadorian Air Force airmen who shut down airports in Quito and elsewhere. President Correa said on October 6 that “The revolt by the air force technical experts was completely different from the police uprising,” and Defense Minister Javier Ponce said on October 8 that any punishment would be up to the Ecuadorian Armed Forces’ own justice system. On October 11, the Air Force began disciplinary proceedings against 160 airmen. Though no criminal prosecutions have been opened, several members of the air force’s intelligence apparatus were fired after the uprising.