

THE TRUMP EFFECT: TRENDS IN MAJOR U.S. ARMS SALES

2019



Security
Assistance
Monitor

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The Center for International Policy (CIP) is an independent nonprofit center for research, public education and advocacy on U.S. foreign policy. CIP works to make a peaceful, just and sustainable world the central pursuit of U.S. foreign policy. CIP's programs offer common sense solutions to address the most urgent threats to our planet: war, corruption, inequality and climate change. CIP's scholars, researchers, journalists, analysts and former government officials provide a unique mixture of issue-area expertise, access to high-level officials, media savvy and strategic vision. The Center was founded in 1975, in the wake of the Vietnam War, by former diplomats and peace activists who sought to reorient U.S. foreign policy to advance international cooperation as the primary vehicle for solving global challenges and promoting human rights. Today CIP brings diverse voices to bear on key foreign policy decisions and makes the evidence-based case for why and how the United States must redefine the concept of national security in the 21st century, and adopt greater cooperation, transparency and accountability in the international relations of the United States.

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The Security Assistance Monitor (SAM) is a program of the Center for International Policy focused on enhancing transparency and oversight of U.S. foreign security aid and arms sales. By providing comprehensive U.S. security assistance data and by conducting independent, data-driven research, we seek to inform and elevate the debate among civil society, journalists, scholars, and policy makers in the United States and abroad about the risks and best uses of U.S. security assistance to improve human security.

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Report cover photo is an official U.S. Department of Defense (Marine Corps) photo taken by Cpl. Brian Burdett of the F-35B on June 29, 2016.



SUMMARY

The Trump administration made at least \$85.1 billion in arms sales offers in 2019, the highest level of its three years in office, even as it continued to emphasize the supposed economic benefits of weapons exports to the detriment of human rights and security concerns.¹ Due to the lack of full transparency on Direct Commercial Sales (DCS) licensed by the State Department, this figure is a conservative estimate (see box on declining transparency in arms sales data, below).

During the first three years of the Trump administration, the United States government approved and brokered at least \$240 billion worth of arms deals under the Pentagon's Foreign Military Sales (FMS) program and through Direct Commercial Sales (DCS) licensed by the State Department. Measured by offers under the FMS program – the only measure for which full statistics are available – arms sales offers in the first three years of the Trump administration averaged \$60.6 billion per year, higher than the \$53.95 billion per year for the eight years of the Obama administration. When adjusted for inflation, however, the gap narrows considerably, with an average \$63 billion in sales per year under Trump versus \$61.5 billion per year under Obama.²

Congress has taken an unprecedented level of interest in U.S. arms sales and military support in the past few years in response to concerns about the security and human rights impacts of U.S. arms export decisions made by the Trump Administration. Most notably it has passed resolutions under the War Powers Resolution to end U.S. military support for the Saudi/UAE-led war in Yemen and blocked a major sale of bombs to Saudi Arabia of the type that had been used in attacks on civilian targets in an air campaign that has killed thousands of civilians. These actions were vetoed by President Trump, in part due to claims that U.S. sales to Saudi Arabia are major job creators.

President Trump's claims on arms sales and jobs don't hold up to scrutiny. All publicly available data indicate that arms sales employ roughly one-tenth of one percent of the U.S. labor force, and the President's claims of up to 500,000 jobs from arms sales to Saudi Arabia are more than ten times the actual total of 20,000 to 40,000 jobs. In addition, 10% of U.S. arms offers for 2019 involved licenses for the production of U.S. weapons overseas, further undercutting job creation in the United States.

As best as SAM can tell from the limited DCS data, offers for the export of U.S. firearms appeared to decline in 2019, but sales to repressive regimes like the Philippines and Brazil were of particular concern. However, because nearly a quarter of these sales are based on

incomplete data, it is impossible to say for certain the degree to which sales declined, or if they declined at all.

More importantly, the Trump administration made major changes in firearms export regulations that took effect in March 2020.³ The shift would move a substantial number of firearms – including semi-automatic rifles like the AR-15, which has been used in mass shootings in the United States, as well as pistols and sniper rifles – from the jurisdiction of the State Department to the Department of Commerce. The transfer of authority to Commerce means that these weapons systems will receive reduced vetting on human rights grounds as well as reduced tracking procedures that could make it easier to smuggle U.S. arms to unauthorized third party nations or organizations, including the possibility of transfers to criminal gangs or terrorist organizations.⁴ The easier access to U.S. arms, and increased likelihood that they could fall into the wrong hands, could also put U.S. troops at risk of being attacked with U.S.-origin weapons.

There was a sharp shift in the regional distribution of U.S. arms sales from 2018 to 2019. Looking at FMS, which provides the most complete data picture, East Asia and the Pacific had the largest share of deals by value in 2019, increasing over two and one-half times from 2018 to 2019, from 14.7% in 2018 to 39.0% in 2019. The share of offers to Europe and Eurasia dropped dramatically, from 55.2% of deals in 2018 to just 17.0% in 2019. Deals with countries in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) increased by roughly 50%, from 24.3% to 36.7%. These three regions together accounted for the vast bulk of U.S. arms deals by value in 2019, over 94.1% of all FMS sales.

Top recipients by country in 2019 when accounting for both DCS and FMS notifications were Japan (\$12.6 billion), Taiwan (\$10.8 billion), Morocco (\$10.3 billion), Poland (\$6.50 billion), and Saudi Arabia (\$5.08 billion).

A handful of companies were the primary beneficiaries of U.S. arms offers in 2019. The top three firms – Lockheed Martin, Boeing, and Raytheon – were involved in over \$59 billion worth of arms deals in 2019, over two-thirds of total offers by the Trump administration.

■ Recommendations

- Pass Rep. Ilhan Omar's Stop Arming Human Rights Abusers Act, a comprehensive bill which would stop all U.S. arms – under both FMS and commercial sales – from going to countries engaged in genocide, violation of the laws of war, or severe internal repression.⁵
- End exports to repressive regimes and allies engaging in unjust wars.
- Make it easier for Congress to be notified and act in advance of deliveries of weapons, not just offers.

- Require Congressional approval of major arms sales, rather than assuming sales will go forward unless Congress votes them down by a veto-proof majority.
- Improve reporting on commercial arms sales offers, including exact figures on the value of each deal and easier public access to the information.
- Restore notifications to Congress on firearms deals of \$1 million or more.
- Ban offsets in U.S. arms exports. These arrangements not only result in a drain of jobs from the United States, but they increase the possibility of corruption in the recipient nation.
- Subject licensed manufacturing of U.S. weapons to greater scrutiny by barring licenses to human rights abusers and requiring votes on license offers greater than \$10 million.

Declining Transparency in U.S. Arms Transfer Data

It's important to note that 2019 was the least transparent environment for public scrutiny of U.S. arms exports since the Security Assistance Monitor (SAM) began tracking U.S. weapons sales. In comparison to previous years, available data on Direct Commercial Sales (DCS) were much more limited. Of the 82 notifications for direct commercial sales, SAM was only able to obtain actual figures for 61 of them, meaning 21 such notifications only have "threshold" amounts, which, in effect, are the minimum value of a given sale which requires reporting to Congress. As a result, 2019's sales numbers are almost assuredly an undercounting, and represent a floor, not a ceiling, of U.S. arms sales in that year. Accordingly, and in an effort to maintain fidelity to an accurate presentation of arms sales trends, comparisons to past years contained in this report will focus on the year-on-year changes in the Foreign Military Sales (FMS) program, for which there is a full accounting. FMS sales are brokered by the Pentagon and involve considerable logistical support from the U.S. government, while Direct Commercial Sales involve a license from the State Department without additional U.S. government involvement in the implementation of the deal. The lack of transparency for Direct Commercial Sales makes a full accounting of arms transfers, especially for things like firearms, impossible, and poses a serious problem for public accountability.

INTRODUCTION

Arms sales have been a persistent preoccupation of the Trump administration. Ever since his first few months in office, when he announced a major arms deal with Saudi Arabia, the President has been promoting arms sales as a job creator and a boon to the U.S. economy, as strategic and human rights concerns take a back seat to economic considerations.⁶

During the first three years of the Trump administration, the United States government approved and brokered at least \$240 billion worth of arms deals, sustaining the U.S. role as the world's leading arms exporting nation. Measured by offers under the Pentagon's Foreign Military Sales (FMS) program – the only measure for which full statistics are available – arms sales offers in the first three years of the Trump administration averaged \$63.0 billion per year, slightly more than the annual average of \$61.5 billion for the eight years of the Obama administration, adjusted for inflation.⁷

This report details U.S. arms sales policy and practices during 2019, with an eye towards their economic, human rights, and security impacts.⁸

The United States made at least \$85.1 billion in foreign arms sales offers in calendar year 2019, a \$6.3 billion increase from the \$78.8 billion in offers concluded in the previous year, and the largest figure since President Trump took office. The arms offers consisted of \$69.8 billion in deals under the Pentagon's Foreign Military Sales (FMS) program and at least \$15.3 billion in Commercial Sales licensed by the State Department. While high by historical standards, these figures lagged behind the \$102 billion in agreements made in 2010, the peak year of the Obama administration.⁹ As noted above, 2019's accounting of Direct Commercial Sales is almost assuredly an undercounting, as total values of these sales became increasingly hard to come by. Instead, SAM has had to rely on threshold amounts, which are the minimum reporting amounts required by congress, and are therefore a floor and not a ceiling of the value of DCS sales in 2019. As a result, with a few exceptions, the proceeding analysis focuses primarily on year-on-year trends for FMS, for which there is more complete data, in an attempt to maintain the fidelity of our methodology.

When including DCS and FMS notifications, top recipients by country in 2019 were Japan (\$12.6 billion), Taiwan (\$10.8 billion), Morocco (\$10.3 billion), Poland (\$6.50 billion), and Saudi Arabia (\$5.08 billion).¹⁰ In keeping with the fact that East Asia and the Pacific had the largest share of arms offers from the U.S. in 2019, the top two recipients were from that region. By comparison, the top five recipients in 2018 were Italy (\$11.4 billion), the United Kingdom (\$7.2 billion), Japan (\$7.2 billion), Belgium (\$6.6 billion), and Saudi Arabia (\$4.4

billion). Japan and Saudi Arabia were the only nations to appear in the top five recipients for both 2018 and 2019.

Despite President Trump's emphasis on the importance of arms exports to Saudi Arabia, offers to that nation have dropped sharply since his first year in office, from \$17.86 billion in 2017 to \$5.08 billion in 2019. Arms offers to the Saudi regime in the first three years of the Trump administration have totaled at least \$27.4 billion, a far cry from the greatly exaggerated \$110 billion in deals announced by President Trump in his May 2017 trip to the country.¹¹ But the dollar value of sales is only one measure of the significance of the U.S.-Saudi military relationship. The Trump administration has concluded two major deals for precision-guided bombs to Saudi Arabia of the type being used in its brutal war in Yemen, as well as upgrades of its U.S.-supplied F-15 aircraft that are a bulwark of the Saudi air war in Yemen.

For a full listing of the top 20 U.S. arms recipients in 2018 and 2019, see table 1.

There was a sharp shift in the regional distribution of U.S. arms sales from 2018 to 2019. Looking at FMS, which provides the most complete data picture, East Asia and the Pacific had the largest share of deals by value in 2019, increasing approximately 2.6 times from 2018 to 2019, from 14.7% in 2018 to 39.0% in 2019. The share of offers to Europe and Eurasia dropped dramatically, from 55.2% of FMS deals in 2018 to just 17.0% in 2019. Deals with countries in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) increased by roughly 50%, from 24.3% to 36.7%. These three regions together accounted for the vast bulk of U.S. arms deals by value in 2019, over 94.1% of all FMS sales. See figure 1, below, for details on the share of sales accounted for by other regions in 2018 and 2019.

Where there was continuity was in the *types* of weapons offered for sale in 2019 versus 2018. When looking just at FMS, military aircraft and engines accounted for 66.2% of offers by value in 2019, followed by bombs and missiles at 20.8%. In 2018, FMS sales of aircraft and engines accounted for 61.6% of sales, while bombs and missiles came in it at a 26.6% share. See figure 2 for the percentage of offers by all relevant categories for 2018 and 2019, based on FMS data.

At first glance, offers for firearms dropped dramatically in 2019, to \$470.7 million in offers from \$759 million in 2018, when including DCS. All firearms sales in 2019 were under the DCS program. The most significant reduction was in offers to Saudi Arabia, which received \$579 million in firearms offers in 2018, versus zero offers in 2019. However, 7 of the 29 notifications for firearms only provided threshold value, which means those values could be significantly higher, making year-on-year analysis difficult.

A handful of companies were the primary beneficiaries of U.S. arms sales in 2019, with 69% deals by value involving major systems produced by Lockheed Martin (\$31.2 billion), Raytheon (\$14.2 billion), and Boeing (\$13.9 billion).

Despite its repeated claims about the role of arms sales in creating American jobs, the Trump administration continued to provide licenses to other countries to manufacture or

Table I: Top 20 Recipients of U.S. DCS and FMS Arms Sales Notifications*

2018		2019		
1	Italy	\$11,434,262,225	1 Japan	\$12,591,883,750
2	United Kingdom	\$7,225,907,843	2 Taiwan	\$10,849,060,000
3	Japan	\$7,137,289,999	3 Morocco	\$10,257,600,000
4	Belgium	\$6,530,000,000	4 Poland	\$6,500,000,000
5	Saudi Arabia	\$4,456,885,964	5 Saudi Arabia	\$5,082,790,396
6	Germany	\$3,900,000,000	6 United Arab Emirates	\$4,740,300,000
7	Turkey	\$3,500,000,000	7 India	\$4,553,000,500
8	Sweden	\$3,348,000,000	8 United Kingdom	\$4,324,900,000
9	South Korea	\$2,962,120,000	9 Bahrain	\$3,378,000,000
10	Slovakia	\$2,910,000,000	10 Qatar	\$3,091,310,500
11	Spain	\$2,160,400,000	11 South Korea	\$2,588,900,000
12	Israel	\$2,070,408,725	12 Bulgaria	\$1,673,000,000
13	Netherlands	\$1,874,205,555	13 New Zealand	\$1,400,000,000
14	Mexico	\$1,479,764,750	14 United States	\$1,129,337,492
15	Bahrain	\$1,412,570,442	15 Czech Republic	\$1,005,000,000
16	India	\$1,316,029,641	16 Australia	\$787,016,877
17	Egypt	\$1,300,000,000	17 Thailand	\$674,793,009
18	Norway	\$1,276,678,845	18 Belgium	\$600,000,000
19	Morocco	\$1,259,000,000	19 Greece	\$600,000,000
20	UAE	\$1,032,797,373	20 Egypt	\$554,000,000


* As described above, a number of commercial sales in 2019 only provided threshold amounts. We are including those sales in this table.

assemble U.S.-designed weapons overseas. The number of these deals stayed steady, going from 41 in 2018 to 38 in 2019. But the value of the deals dropped sharply from \$20.3 billion in 2018 to \$9.1 billion in 2019. Some of the difference may be accounted for by the fact that for seven of those deals only threshold values were available, suggesting an undercounting of the total value of manufacturing licenses. The biggest change from 2018 to 2019 was that 2018 included a \$10.7 billion deal for a Final Assembly and Checkout (FACO) facility for F-35 aircraft in Italy, an offer that is unlikely to be repeated at that scale.

REGIONAL ANALYSIS

Note that the regional analysis will give preference to FMS data in its year-to-year comparisons, as it is the only program with complete information available.

Figure I: Regional Breakdown of U.S. Arms Sales Offers, 2018 vs. 2019



Europe and Eurasia

All of the major arms offers to Europe and Eurasia in 2019 involved combat planes or other aircraft. The largest deal was a \$6.5 billion sale of 32 F-35 combat aircraft to Poland. The next largest offer was for work on the engines and electrical power systems of the United Kingdom’s F-35s, worth a total of \$2.67 billion, followed by a \$1.67 billion deal to Bulgaria for F-16 aircraft and an additional deal for the United Kingdom worth \$1.21 billion for support for the F-35 propulsion system. These four deals alone accounted for over two-thirds of U.S. offers to Europe and Eurasia in 2019, by value.

Other major deals to Europe and Eurasia in 2019 included an \$800 million deal for Black Hawk transport helicopters to the Czech Republic; a \$600 million deal for MH-60 multi-mission helicopters to Greece; and a \$600 million offer of MQ-9A remotely piloted aircraft to Belgium. The aircraft sales to Poland, Bulgaria and the Czech Republic were concluded with the perceived threat from Russia as a significant factor.

As noted in last year's report, President Trump's suggestion that the U.S. is bearing an unfair burden for the defense of Europe is partially offset by the flow of funds from European countries to the United States via arms sales, although this factor was far less significant in 2019. FMS offers to European allies dropped from more than half of all U.S. FMS offers worldwide to 17.1% in 2019.

■ Middle East and North Africa

After a significant decline in 2018, FMS offers to the Middle East and North Africa increased substantially, to 36.6% of all U.S. arms offers worldwide. This suggests that the saturation of the market by major deals made earlier in the decade – most notably a package of deals to Saudi Arabia for over \$60 billion made in 2010 – has begun to dissipate.

Even so, the volume of sales to Saudi Arabia continued to fall short of its record numbers, in large part due to the fact that Riyadh has already made major purchases of combat planes, attack helicopters, armored vehicles, combat ships, and missile defense systems earlier in the decade.¹² The most important element of the Saudi trade in recent years has been the transfer of precision-guided bombs and aircraft maintenance and training services that have enabled the Saudi regime to wage a brutal and indiscriminate bombing campaign in Yemen, discussed further below.

U.S. arms offers to the Middle East and North Africa were dominated by five major recipients, all of which were in the Persian Gulf. When including both DCS and FMS, the top recipient was Morocco (\$10.3 billion), which is purchasing F-16s and related support and ammunition for existing aircraft at a total of over \$5.2 billion, along with a \$4.2 billion deal for AH-64 Apache attack helicopters. The rest of the top five recipients were Saudi Arabia (\$5.08 billion); UAE (\$4.74 billion); Bahrain (\$3.38 billion); and Qatar (\$3.09 billion). These five recipients accounted for 93% of deals with the Middle East and North Africa, measured by value for FMS and DCS.

In addition to the deals with Morocco cited above, the largest offers to the region in 2019 were \$3 billion to Qatar for Apache attack helicopters; \$2.73 billion to the UAE for a Patriot missile defense system; \$2.6 billion to Saudi Arabia for two deals involving aircraft follow-on and support for U.S.-supplied aircraft; and \$2.48 billion to Bahrain for a Patriot system.

Saudi Arabia was also the main recipient of a multi-country \$1.571 billion deal for Paveway guided bombs that also included several European recipients.¹³

The consequences of U.S. arms sales on the Middle East were underscored by Turkey's invasion of northern Syria, which killed and displaced Kurds and Kurdish-led Syrian militias which had been the most effective U.S. allies in the war against ISIS.¹⁴ U.S.-supplied weapons were used extensively in the invasion, as all of Turkey's fighter aircraft and the bulk of its armored vehicles are U.S.-supplied. U.S. arms were used on both sides of the conflict, as Syrian opposition forces had received over \$2.5 billion in U.S. arms and training over the past five years alone.¹⁵

■ East Asia and Pacific

U.S. arms sales offers to East Asia and the Pacific increased sharply, from \$7.2 billion in FMS in calendar year 2018 to \$27.2 billion in 2019. When including DCS, the rise is slightly less dramatic, climbing from \$11.2 to \$29.3 billion. In 2019, 81.8% of the FMS offers that were made went to just two countries – Japan (\$11.6 billion) and Taiwan (\$10.7 billion).

The largest offer to Japan was for upgrades of that nation's U.S.-supplied F-15J aircraft (\$4.5 billion). Including both DCS and FMS, the largest category of offers to Japan by value was for missile defense, including Standard air defense missiles (\$3.3 billion) and an Aegis missile defense system (\$2.15 billion). There were also two offers worth a total of almost \$1 billion for modification, maintenance, and repair for the F-135 engines for Japan's F-35 fleet.

The vast bulk of the value of offers to Taiwan in 2019 was an \$8 billion sale of 66 F-16 aircraft and support equipment for M-1A2 tanks for \$2 billion.

South Korea ranked third in the region in sales from the United States, at \$2.5 billion. Its biggest deals were for contractor support for RQ-4 remotely piloted vehicles (\$950 million) and MH-60R multi-mission helicopters (\$800 million).

Two sales that were small in dollar value but could have serious human rights consequences are Direct Commercial Sales that included a license for the manufacture and export of thousands of handguns chambered in .22 Magnum worth \$39.6 million and an offer of 7.62mm rifles and suppressors for \$2.40 million to the Philippines. These sales are of concern because the Philippine police and government-backed death squads have engaged in extrajudicial killings under the guise of a "war on drugs" that have left thousands dead and injured, including political activists, environmentalists, journalists, and community leaders.¹⁶

The missile defense and combat aircraft capabilities offered to key Asian allies during 2019 are relevant to potential security challenges posed by China, which has taken center stage as a great power competitor in the Trump administration's National Defense Strategy. The surge in sales to East Asia suggests that U.S. arms sales and security assistance efforts have begun to align with the new strategic direction mapped out by the Pentagon.

■ South and Central Asia

After registering as the smallest recipient of U.S. arms offers of any region in 2018, FMS deals with South and Central Asia increased nearly fivefold in 2019, up to \$4.6 billion from \$930 million in 2018. However, these figures do not give a full picture of U.S. military transfers to the region, excluding the many billions of armaments sent to the region through U.S. security aid programs. Afghanistan has received \$95 billion in arms and training since FY2001 as part of the Afghan National Security Forces Fund, the largest amount of security assistance provided to any nation during that time period.¹⁷ The fund was budgeted at \$4.9 billion in Fiscal Year 2019. Approximately \$750 million of this amount was allocated for "equipment and transportation," with additional funds included under "sustainment," although it was not reported how much of that category was weapons related.¹⁸

All the major arms sales offers to South and Central Asia in 2019 were to India, including \$2.60 billion for MH-60R multi-mission helicopters; \$1.02 billion for Mk 45 gun system; \$670 million for sustainment of C-17 transport planes; and \$630 million for manufacture of Unmanned Aerial Vehicles in India (working in conjunction with Australia and the United Kingdom). Additional sales are in the works, as indicated by the \$3.5 billion in offers for Seahawk and Apache helicopters announced during President Trump's February 2020 trip to India.¹⁹

■ Western Hemisphere

The volume of U.S. arms offers in the Western Hemisphere remains relatively low compared to other regions. This pattern continues, with total FMS offers going down from \$1.64 billion in 2018 to \$509 million in 2019. Whether measured by DCS or FMS and DCS sales combined, the Western Hemisphere's figures represent less than three-quarters of one percent of U.S. arms offers in 2019 when measured by FMS.

In an unusual occurrence, several of the largest deals were for end use by the United States but were categorized as a DCS because they included manufacturing support to foreign countries. In effect, the U.S. was selling production support for F-35's and rocket launch systems that would eventually be used by the United States.

The largest offers in the Western Hemisphere not destined for end use in the U.S. in 2019 were a deal for \$387 million to Canada for MK 54 torpedoes and a deal with Argentina for \$78 million worth of support for its P-3C anti-submarine warfare planes. Brazil received a license worth \$10.6 million for the manufacture of “sporting handguns and rifles” and a DCS worth at least \$1 million for 9mm semi-automatic pistols, both of concern given that nation’s worsening human rights record.²⁰ Another deal for small arms involved a \$3.03 million sale to Jamaica for 5.56-millimeter automatic rifles.

WHAT IS BEING OFFERED – TYPES OF EQUIPMENT


■ Major Combat Systems

The distribution of the *types* of weapons offered to foreign customers by the U.S. stayed relatively stable between 2018 and 2019. The military aircraft and engines sector accounted for 66.16% of all U.S. FMS offers in 2019, versus 46% in 2018. Bombs and missiles were the second highest category, at 20.84% of all FMS offers, versus 26.62% in 2018. The two categories – missiles and bombs and aircraft and engines – accounted for 87% of the value of all FMS offers in 2019.

The main drivers of the increased share for military aircraft in 2019 were ten deals, which include both DCS and FMS offers: \$8.00 billion for 66 F-16 combat aircraft to Taiwan; \$6.50 billion for 32 F-35s to Poland; \$4.50 billion for upgrades to Japan’s fleet of U.S.-supplied F-15s; \$4.25 billion for AH-64 Apache attack helicopters to Morocco; \$3.79 billion for F-16s to Morocco; \$3.00 billion for AH-64E Apache Helicopters to Qatar; \$2.67 billion to the United Kingdom for work on the electrical systems of their F-35 aircraft; \$2.60 billion for MH-60R multi-mission helicopters to India; \$1.80 billion for follow on maintenance and services for a variety of U.S.-supplied aircraft for Saudi Arabia; and \$1.67 billion for F-16s to Bulgaria. Together these nine deals accounted for nearly two-thirds of the value of DCS and FMS military aircraft offers in 2019. Within the major deals, the biggest items by type were F-16s (\$12.3 billion) and sales and maintenance of F-35s (\$9.1 billion).

The largest Direct Commercial Sales and Foreign Military Sales of missiles, bombs and missile defense systems in 2019 included \$2.73 billion for a Patriot missile defense system for the UAE; \$2.15 billion for an Aegis missile defense system for Japan; \$1.57 billion for the manufacture and sale of Paveway guided bombs for the Royal Saudi Air Force; and \$1.15 billion for Standard air defense missiles for Japan. These four deals accounted for 41% of U.S. DCS and FMS offers of bombs, missiles, and missile defense systems worldwide in 2019.

Figure II: U.S. Arms Sales Notifications by Weapons Category



*Note: "Firearms, Guns, & Ammo" includes USML categories I, II, & III

Firearms

Offers for firearms, which were all carried out as Direct Commercial Sales, appear to have dropped in 2019, to \$470.8 million in offers from \$745.7 million in 2018. The big difference was in offers to Saudi Arabia, which received \$579 million in firearms offers in 2018, versus zero offers in 2019. Nevertheless, seven of these deals, or nearly a quarter of all the notifications, only include threshold amounts, suggesting that the \$470.8 million is an undercounting.

While still considerably smaller in terms of dollar value than major combat systems like military aircraft or missile defense systems, firearms exports have significant human rights implications, as they are often weapons of choice in civil wars and in domestic repression.

The largest firearms deal in 2019 was a \$135.9 million multi-country offer of rifles and pistols to Belgium and Canada, followed by a \$72.0 million sale of 7.62mm automatic rifles

to India; a \$62.8 million deal for submachine guns and rifles for the Royal Thai Police; a \$40.6 million multi-country deal for the manufacture of firearms and firearms components with Germany and Israel; and a \$39.6 million deal with the Philippines for the manufacture of pistols chambered in .22 Magnum. These five deals accounted for nearly three-quarters of U.S. firearms deals by value for 2019.

The sale to the Philippines is of particular concern given that nation's record of internal repression and extrajudicial killings by its military and police forces.²¹ As noted above, Brazil, another country of human rights concern, received an offer of \$10.6 million for the manufacture of components for "sporting handguns and rifles" and an offer worth at least \$1 million for 9mm semi-automatic pistols.²²

Table II: U.S. Commercial Firearms Offers in 2019

Country	Sale Details	Notification Value
Global	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Various calibers of centerfire shot, bolt-action, semi-automatic, lever-action rifles, and center fire pistols to Belgium, Canada, and Japan to support the manufacture, integration, installation, operation, training, testing, maintenance, and repair of sporting and recreational rifles. for commercial resale To Israel and Germany to support the manufacture of firearm components, parts, accessories, barrels, blank receivers, and breech mechanisms Rifles and rifle conversion kits to Denmark and Sweden for commercial resale To Italy and Qatar to support the manufacture, integration, assembly, operation, training, testing, and maintenance of 300 Blackout 5.56mm upper and lower receivers and weapon assembly 	\$178,520,618
Thailand	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> 48,303 fully automatic rifles and one fully automatic submachine gun to Thailand for end use by the Thai Royal Police M16A4, M4, and MS 5.56mm automatic rifles and parts for end use by the Royal Thai Army M16A4 upgrade kits 	\$99,793,009
India	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> 7.62mm automatic rifles and parts to India for the Indian Armed Forces 	\$72,000,500

Philippines	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • License for manufacture and export of 22 Magnum pistols • 7.62mm semi-automatic rifles and suppressors to the Philippines for end use by the Department of National Defense, Armed Forces of the Philippines 	\$41,954,576
Oman	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • .50 caliber machine guns to Oman for the Royal Oman Guard • 5.56mm semi-automatic assault rifles to Oman for the Omani Ministry of Defense • M16A4 5.56mm fully-automatic rifles to the Royal Oman Police • 7.62 mm machine guns 	\$27,399,988
Norway	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • .50 caliber automatic machine guns and associated parts and spares 	\$17,081,146
Brazil	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • To support the manufacture of components for sporting handguns and rifles • 9 mm semi-automatic pistols and spare barrels 	\$11,600,000
Israel	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • To support the development and manufacture of component parts of pistols and rifles 	\$4,925,000
Netherlands	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 688 SIGMCX .300 caliber automatic assault rifles and spare parts • MAG58 7.62mm machine guns and associated barrel assemblies to the Ministry of Defense 	\$3,956,465
Qatar	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • To support the manufacture of the fusion rifle scope/target illuminator system for integration into the Qatari MoD's 5.56mm rifles • Automatic rifles 	\$3,210,000
Jamaica	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 5.56mm automatic rifles, barrels, and upper receivers for use by the Jamaican Defense Forces 	\$3,028,488
Canada	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • To support the manufacture, integration, installation, operation, training, and testing of small caliber weapons parts 	\$2,400,000
Australia	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • M134D 7.62mm machine guns to the Australian Department of Defense on their MRH90 helicopter fleet 	\$1,516,877
UAE	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • .50 caliber semi-automatic rifles and sound suppressors to the UAE for end use by the General Headquarters, UAE Armed Forces 	\$1,364,900
Denmark	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 7.62mm machine guns and spare parts 	\$1,000,000
Kuwait	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 5.56mm automatic rifles 	\$1,000,000

The Trump administration made major changes in firearms export regulations that took effect in March 2020.²³ The shift moves a substantial number of firearms – including semi-automatic rifles like the AR-15, which has been used in mass shootings in the United States, as well as pistols and sniper rifles – from the jurisdiction of the State Department to the Department of Commerce. The transfer of authority to Commerce means that these weapons systems will receive reduced vetting on human rights grounds as well as reduced tracking procedures that could make it easier to smuggle U.S. arms to unauthorized third party nations or organizations, including the possibility of transfers to criminal gangs or terrorist organizations.²⁴ The easier access to U.S. arms, and increased likelihood that they could fall into the wrong hands, could also put U.S. troops at risk of being attack with U.S.-origin weapons.

The ability of Congress to monitor firearms sales will also be drastically diminished under the Trump reforms, as it will no longer be notified of commercial sales of firearms valued at \$1 million or more, greatly reducing its ability to monitor or block sales to repressive regimes.

CORPORATE BENEFICIARIES

A handful of companies were the primary beneficiaries of U.S. arms offers in 2019. The top three firms – Lockheed Martin, Boeing, and Raytheon – were involved in over \$59 billion worth of arms deals in 2019, over two-thirds of total offers by the Trump administration.

Lockheed Martin was involved in deals worth over \$31 billion, including \$14.4 billion related to sales and upgrades of F-16s to Taiwan, Morocco, and Bulgaria; \$6.5 billion for sales and support for F-35s to Poland; \$2.15 billion for an Aegis missile defense system for Japan; and \$1.4 billion for C-130J transport planes to New Zealand.

Boeing was involved in deals worth \$13.9 billion, including \$7.2 billion for sales of Apache attack helicopters to Morocco and Qatar; \$4.5 billion in F-15 upgrades and maintenance for Japan; \$830 million for CH-47 Chinook helicopters to the UAE; and \$670 million for support of India's C-17 transport aircraft.

Raytheon was involved in deals worth \$14.2 billion, including deals for \$5.2 billion for Patriot missile defense systems to the UAE and Bahrain; \$4.4 billion worth of Standard anti-missile missiles for Japan; and \$1.57 billion for Paveway guided bombs to Saudi Arabia.

It should be noted that not all of the revenues from the major deals cited above will go to the prime contractors. Support services and secondary contractors will consume some of

the funds involved in any major arms deal. But the figures above are a good gauge of which contractors benefit most from offers under the FMS and commercial sales program.

ARMS SALES AND JOBS

One of the Trump administration's primary rationales for its efforts to expand U.S. arms sales is the assertion that weapons exports create large numbers of jobs in the United States, but this claim is both misleading and inaccurate.

Arms sales are a poor job creator. Other forms of production, like infrastructure and clean energy, produce up to 1.5 times as many jobs per dollar spent as weapons production. And new markets in areas like green technology are many times larger than the global arms market.²⁵ Jobs should not be the determining factor in arms sales decision making, but given that they too often are, especially under the current administration, it's important to note that there are far better ways to expand employment than exporting weaponry.

The case of Saudi Arabia underscores the large gap between myth and reality with respect to arms sales-related jobs. President Trump has repeatedly claimed that there are hundreds of thousands of U.S. jobs tied to arms sales to that nation.²⁶ He has even used this argument in opposing a reduction in U.S. sales to the Saudi regime in the aftermath of its murder of U.S.-resident journalist and *Washington Post* contributor Jamal Khashoggi and its ongoing killing of civilians in its brutal intervention in Yemen.²⁷ Trump's statement on the issue explicitly cited the revenue from arms sales as a reason not to take action against the Saudi regime for the Khashoggi murder:

"Of the \$450 billion, \$110 billion will be spent on the purchase of military equipment from Boeing, Lockheed Martin, Raytheon and many other great U.S. defense contractors. If we foolishly cancel these contracts, Russia and China would be the enormous beneficiaries – and very happy to acquire all of this newfound business. It would be a wonderful gift to them directly from the United States!"²⁸

President Trump's assertions on arms exports and jobs don't stand up to even minimal scrutiny. Based on actual deliveries of arms -- the best measure of how much money is actually flowing in any given year pursuant to current and past weapons offers -- U.S. jobs tied to Saudi arms deals likely numbered in the range of 20,000 to 40,000 jobs, or less than one-tenth of President Trump's highest claims of employment tied to U.S. arms sales to the regime in Riyadh.²⁹

U.S. arms sales more broadly also create far fewer U.S. jobs than is commonly assumed. For the most recent year for which data on deliveries under the Pentagon's Foreign Military

Sales program are available, they totaled \$27.4 billion, which by standard estimating procedures would generate 189,000 jobs in the United States, in a labor force of over 160 million people.³⁰ That would put the share of arms export-related jobs at roughly one-tenth of one per cent of the total U.S. job market. This figure is likely an overstatement, because many of the jobs associated with U.S. arms sales are based overseas due to coproduction and offset agreements, and many others may not be the equivalent of full-time employment on products destined for foreign customers, as workers switch between production for export and work on weapons purchased by the Pentagon.

The exact value of U.S. offsets and coproduction agreements in any given year cannot be determined due to inadequate reporting procedures, but it is clear that they drain substantial numbers of jobs from the United States. An offset agreement involves the provision of economic benefits by the exporting company to the recipient nation as a way to counterbalance or “offset” the large expenditures involved in importing a major weapons system. A few examples should suffice to indicate the substantial impact of these deals

In Saudi Arabia, for example, that country’s goal is for 50% of the value of all of its arms imports to be spent in Saudi Arabia by 2030.³¹ Examples include a Lockheed Martin deal to assemble helicopters supplied to Saudi Arabia by its Sikorsky helicopter subsidiary *in Saudi Arabia*.³² Other U.S. firms like Raytheon and Boeing have set up offices in the Persian Gulf to help them broker similar arrangements in efforts to help countries like Saudi Arabia and the UAE build up their defense industries. Boeing has entered into a \$450 million deal with Saudi Arabian Military Industries (SAMI) aimed at localizing more than one half of maintenance, repair and overhaul of U.S.-supplied aircraft in Saudi Arabia by 2030, generating 6,000 Saudi jobs in the process.³³ In the UAE, Lockheed Martin is helping that country develop factories to produce robotic machine tools, which can be used in the defense and aerospace sectors. It is also helping train UAE personnel in cybersecurity and space technologies.³⁴


The largest and most lucrative deals involving overseas production of U.S. weaponry involve work on the F-35 combat aircraft. In addition to component production in a number of partner nations, both Italy and Japan are building Final Assembly and Checkout (FACO) facilities for the aircraft, which will generate significant numbers of jobs in those countries

Last but not least, the Trump administration has sharply increased the number of deals in which foreign nations produce U.S.-developed weaponry in their countries under licensing and coproduction agreements. These deals support production overseas, as well as helping potential competitors build up their own defense industries. In 2018 and 2019, the Trump administration entered into 38 and 40 deals, respectively, involving the manufacture of U.S.-supplied arms overseas, more than double the 18 deals made in 2017. The dollar value

of manufacturing-related deals for 2018 was \$19.8 billion, a figure which dropped sharply to \$9.1 billion in 2019, though several large notifications provided only threshold amounts, meaning this could be a severe undercounting. Nevertheless, the main difference in the value of manufacturing license deals between 2018 and 2019 was a \$10.7 billion 2018 deal with Italy for a final assembly and checkout (FACO) facility for F-35 combat aircraft. Work will continue under this license for years to come, but the value is registered at the time the license is granted. Hence the drop off in the value of new licenses in 2019 does not necessarily reflect an immediate drop in overseas production of U.S weapons and weapons components.

The dollar value of licensing and manufacturing deals in 2019 accounted for over 10% of all U.S. arms offers in that year, an indication of the value of arms offers that involve overseas production. Even so, it is difficult to ascertain exactly the dollar value of manufacturing agreements, given the large proportion of notifications that only provided threshold amounts.

Figure III: Major U.S. Arms Sales Offers Involving Foreign Manufacturing, 2018 vs. 2019



*Note: "Firearms, Guns, & Ammo" includes USML categories I, II, & III

CONGRESS WEIGHS IN

Congress has taken an unprecedented level of interest in U.S. arms sales and military support in the past few years in response to concerns about the security and human rights impacts of U.S. arms export decisions made by the Trump Administration.

The greatest area of congressional interest has been in response to the brutal U.S.-backed war in Yemen. The actions of the Saudi/UAE-led coalition there – aided by tens of billions of dollars-worth of U.S.-supplied bombs, aircraft, and armored vehicles supplied by the Obama and Trump administrations -- have resulted in the deaths of thousands of civilians and driven millions of Yemenis to the brink of famine.³⁵

Congress took two major actions related to arms to Saudi Arabia and the UAE in 2019. The first was passage in both houses of Congress of a War Powers Resolution that would have ended U.S. military support for the Saudi/UAE coalition in Yemen, which was vetoed by President Trump. The Senate effort was led by Senators Bernie Sanders (I-VT), Mike Lee (R-UT) and Chris Murphy (D-CT), and the House effort was led by Rep. Ro Khanna (D-CA).³⁶ This marked the first time Congress had invoked the War Powers Resolution with respect to an overseas military engagement.

In actions specifically related to arms sales, in June 2019 both houses voted down an \$8.1 billion package of sales to Saudi Arabia, the UAE and several other nations that were put forward on an “emergency” basis by the Trump administration in an effort to sideline normal Congressional notification procedures and rush the deals through. The offers most relevant to the war in Yemen were a \$1.57 billion sale of Paveway guided bombs to Saudi Arabia and \$2.6 billion in offers for upgrade and maintenance of Saudi combat aircraft. The Congressional move to block the emergency arms sales were also vetoed by President Trump. Joseph Biden, the presumptive Democratic nominee for president, has called for an end to U.S. arms and support for Saudi Arabia, so the issue will continue to be debated throughout 2020 and beyond.³⁷ And the increased Congressional involvement in arms sales policy sparked by the Saudi case may set the stage for reforms in how Congress monitors and regulates U.S. arms sales more generally.

On firearms, Rep. Norma Torres (D-CA) sponsored a bill that would have blocked the Trump administration’s changes in firearms export regulations. The bill was incorporated into the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA), but it was stripped out in the Senate-House conference in advance of passage of the final version of the NDAA.³⁸

The fate of Saudi arms sales and firearms regulation in 2019 – where strong Congressional action was blocked by either the president or one house of Congress – suggests the need

for stronger tools for Congress to oversee, and if necessary stop, problematic weapons exports.³⁹ A number of ideas along these lines are outlined in the recommendations section, below.

■ Recommendations

- Pass Rep. Ilhan Omar’s Stop Arming Human Rights Abusers Act, a comprehensive bill which would stop all U.S. arms – both FMS and commercial – to countries engaged in genocide, violation of the laws of war, or severe internal repression.⁴⁰
- End exports to repressive regimes and allies engaging in unjust wars.
- Make it easier for Congress to be notified and act in advance of deliveries of weapons, not just offers.
- Require Congressional approval of major arms sales, rather than assuming sales will go forward unless Congress votes them down by a veto-proof majority.
- Improve reporting on commercial arms sales offers, including exact figures on the value of each deal and easier public access to the information.
- Restore notifications to Congress on firearms deals of \$1 million or more.
- Ban offsets in U.S. arms exports. These arrangements not only result in a drain of jobs from the United States, but they increase the possibility of corruption in the recipient nation.
- Subject licensed manufacturing of U.S. weapons to greater scrutiny by barring licenses to human rights abusers and requiring votes on license offers greater than \$10 million.

APPENDIX: LIST OF U.S. ARMS OFFERS IN 2018

	Date	Country	Sale Type	Notification Amount	Item
1.	29-Jan-19	Japan	FMS	\$2,150,000,000	AEGIS Weapon System
2.	6-Feb-19	India	FMS	\$190,000,000	777 Large Aircraft Infrared Countermeasures Self-Protection Suite
3.	12-Feb-19	Israel	FMS	\$238,000,000	Namer Armored Personnel Carrier (APC-MT883) Power Packs Less Transmissions (NPPLT) and Integrated Logistics Support
4.	12-Feb-19	Canada	DCS	\$2,400,000	To support the manufacture, integration, installation, operation, training, and testing of small caliber weapons parts
5.	13-Feb-19	Global	DCS	\$350,000,000	To Italy, Turkey, and the Netherlands to support the manufacture of the F-35 Lightning II's Center Fuselage and related assemblies, subassemblies, and components associated with all variants of the F-35 Aircraft
6.	13-Feb-19	Brazil	DCS	\$10,600,000	To support the manufacture of components for sporting handguns and rifles
7.	26-Feb-19	Global	DCS	\$356,310,000	To Norway, Italy, Japan, and Denmark to support the manufacture, integration, installation, operation, training, testing, maintenance, and repair of auxiliary aerostructures and wing conventional control surfaces for the F-35 aircraft
8.	11-Mar-19	United States	DCS	\$314,000,000	To support the manufacture, development, integration, and support for Air-to-Air Pylons for the F-35 Lightning II Aircraft for end-use by the United States
9.	11-Mar-19	Japan	DCS	\$38,993,750	To support the manufacture, integration, assembly, operation, training, testing, and maintenance of AN/ARC-164 (RT-1145 and RT-1504) UHF Receiver/Transmitters and related radio equipment
10.	11-Mar-19	Oman	DCS	\$2,724,988	M16A4 5.56mrn fully-automatic rifles to the Royal Oman Police
11.	11-Mar-19	Turkey	DCS	\$0	To support the manufacture, sales, and maintenance training of all variants of Armored Combat Vehicle (ACV) Family of Vehicles, Sharpshooter and 40/50 Turrets, the remotely fired .50 caliber Cupola, and modernization kits and materials
12.	12-Mar-19	Australia	FMS	\$240,500,000	AIM-120C-7 Advanced Medium-Range Air-to-Air Missiles
13.	15-Mar-19	Spain	FMS	\$107,000,000	Assault Amphibious Vehicles
14.	25-Mar-19	Morocco	FMS	\$3,787,000,000	F-16 Block 72 New Purchase
15.	25-Mar-19	Morocco	FMS	\$985,200,000	F-16 Block 52+ Upgrade to F-16V Configuration
16.	26-Mar-19	Belgium	FMS	\$600,000,000	MQ-9B SkyGuardian Remotely Piloted Aircraft (RPA)

17.	27-Mar-19	Global	DCS	\$875,890,000	To the United Kingdom and Israel to support the development, integration, and support for F-135 propulsion system Organizational Level (O-Level) maintenance field training, and services for the operation and sustainment of the F-35 Lightning II air systems operated by the Ministry of Defense in Israel
18.	27-Mar-19	Global	DCS	\$40,600,000	To Israel and Germany to support the manufacture of firearm components, parts, accessories, barrels, blank receivers, and breech mechanisms
19.	27-Mar-19	Oman	DCS	\$15,980,000	.50 caliber machine guns to Oman for the Royal Oman Guard
20.	27-Mar-19	Oman	DCS	\$7,695,000	5.56mm semi-automatic assault rifles
21.	2-Apr-19	India	FMS	\$2,600,000,000	MH-60R Multi-Mission Helicopters
22.	2-Apr-19	United States	DCS	\$237,687,492	To the United Kingdom and Spain to support the production of the United States Army's Guided Multiple Launch Rocket System (GMLRS) weapon systems for use by the United States Army
23.	9-Apr-19	Japan	FMS	\$1,150,000,000	Standard Missile (SM)-3 Block IB
24.	9-Apr-19	Global	DCS	\$185,000,000	Manufacturing license agreement to Denmark, Italy, Japan, and the Netherlands to support the design, development, and manufacture of composite components and subassemblies for the F-35 Aircraft Center Fuselage for end-use by the governments of the United States, Denmark, Italy, and Japan
25.	9-Apr-19	Global	DCS	\$160,500,000	License amendment to manufacturing agreement with Australia, Italy, Japan, and the Netherlands to support the manufacture of composite components and subassemblies for the F-35 Lightning II Aircraft for end-use by Australia, Italy, and Japan
26.	10-Apr-19	Global	DCS	\$334,950,000	To Turkey, Poland, and the United Kingdom for the manufacture, inspection, test, delivery, and repair of machined parts, machined assemblies, and components for the H-60/S-70, H-53, and H-92 model helicopters
27.	10-Apr-19	Philippines	DCS	\$2,404,576	7.62mm semi-automatic rifles and suppressors to the Philippines for end use by the Department of National Defense, Armed Forces of the Philippines
28.	10-Apr-19	Qatar	DCS	\$1,210,000	To support the manufacture of the fusion rifle scope/target illuminator system for integration into the Qatari MoD's 5.56mm rifles
29.	15-Apr-19	Taiwan	FMS	\$500,000,000	CONUS Based F-16 Training
30.	30-Apr-19	Global	DCS	\$630,000,000	Technical data and defense services, to Australia, the United Kingdom, and India to support the manufacture, integration, installation, operation, training, testing, maintenance, and repair of Unmanned Aerial Systems in India

31.	30-Apr-19	United States	DCS	\$357,000,000	To support the manufacture, development, integration, and support for Air-to-Ground Pylons for the F-35 Lightning II Aircraft for end-use by the United States
32.	30-Apr-19	Global	DCS	\$245,529,389	Republic of Korea and Thailand to support the manufacture, integration, installation, operation, training, testing, maintenance, and repair of the T-50TH aircraft
33.	30-Apr-19	Global	DCS	\$135,900,000	Various calibers of centerfire shot, bolt-action, semi-automatic, lever-action rifles, and center fire pistols to Belgium, Canada, and Japan to support the manufacture, integration, installation, operation, training, testing, maintenance, and repair of sporting and recreational rifles. for commercial resale
34.	30-Apr-19	United States	DCS	\$69,000,000	To support the manufacture, development, integration, and support for F100 engine parts and components for end-use by the United States
35.	30-Apr-19	United Kingdom	DCS	\$56,000,000	To support the manufacture of Harpoon missile canisters, capsules, certification and training vehicles, inert test vehicles, and discharge verification rounds for the Harpoon Weapon System
36.	30-Apr-19	Jamaica	DCS	\$3,028,488	5.56mm automatic rifles, barrels, and upper receivers for use by the Jamaican Defense Forces
37.	30-Apr-19	Global	DCS	\$1,020,618	Rifles and rifle conversion kits to Denmark and Sweden for commercial resale
38.	1-May-19	Thailand	DCS	\$62,800,700	48,303 fully automatic rifles and one fully automatic submachine gun to Thailand for end use by the Thai Royal Police
39.	3-May-19	United Arab Emirates	FMS	\$2,728,000,000	Patriot Missile System and Related Support Equipment
40.	3-May-19	Bahrain	FMS	\$2,478,000,000	Patriot Missile System and Related Support and Equipment
41.	3-May-19	Czech Republic	FMS	\$800,000,000	UH-60M Black Hawk Helicopters
42.	3-May-19	Bahrain	FMS	\$750,000,000	Weapons to Support F-16 Block 70/F-16V Aircraft Fleet
43.	3-May-19	Czech Republic	FMS	\$205,000,000	AH-1Z Attack Helicopters
44.	6-May-19	Italy	DCS	\$3,200,000	To support the manufacture of Chemical Agent Resistant Coatings (CARC)
45.	6-May-19	Australia	DCS	\$1,516,877	M134D 7.62mm machine guns to the Australian Department of Defense on their MRH90 helicopter fleet
46.	9-May-19	Qatar	FMS	\$3,000,000,000	AH-64E Apache Helicopters with Spare Parts and Related Equipment
47.	16-May-19	Canada	FMS	\$387,000,000	MK 54 Lightweight Torpedoes
48.	16-May-19	Japan	FMS	\$317,000,000	AIM-120C-7 Advanced Medium-Range Air-to-Air Missiles (AMRAAM)
49.	16-May-19	South Korea	FMS	\$313,900,000	SM-2 Block IIIB Standard Missiles

50.	24-May-19	Saudi Arabia	FMS	\$1,800,000,000	Aircraft Follow-on Support and Services
51.	24-May-19	United Arab Emirates	FMS	\$900,000,000	Advanced Precision Kill Weapon System
52.	24-May-19	Saudi Arabia	FMS	\$800,000,000	Aircraft Follow-on Support and Services
53.	24-May-19	Saudi Arabia	FMS	\$136,000,000	Continued Tactical Air Surveillance System Aircraft Support
54.	24-May-19	United Arab Emirates	FMS	\$102,000,000	Javelin Guided Missiles
55.	24-May-19	United Arab Emirates	FMS	\$100,000,000	Follow-On U.S. Marine Corps Training
56.	24-May-19	United Arab Emirates	FMS	\$80,000,000	RQ-21A Blackjack Unmanned Air Vehicles
57.	3-Jun-19	Bulgaria	FMS	\$1,673,000,000	F-16C/D Block 70/72 Aircraft
58.	3-Jun-19	Saudi Arabia	DCS	\$1,571,055,396	To Saudi Arabia, the United Kingdom, Spain, and Italy, to support the coproduction, manufacture, assembly, development, integration, installation, operation, testing, maintenance, repair, and demilitarization of the Paveway and Enhanced Paveway Weapon Systems for the Royal Saudi Air Force F-15, Tornado, and Eurofighter Typhoon Aircraft
59.	3-Jun-19	Global	DCS	\$684,928,000	To the UAE, France, and the United Kingdom to support the integration, installation, operation, training, testing, maintenance, and repair of the Maverick AGM-65 Weapons System and the Paveway II, Paveway III, Enhanced Paveway II, and Enhanced Paveway III Weapons Systems
60.	3-Jun-19	Saudi Arabia	DCS	\$549,000,000	To support the performance of maintenance and repair services of F110 engines
61.	3-Jun-19	Global	DCS	\$356,400,000	To the UAE and the United Kingdom to support the preparation, shipment, delivery, and acceptance of the Guidance Enhanced Missiles (GEM-T)
62.	3-Jun-19	UAE	DCS	\$325,250,000	To the UAE to support the integration of the FMU-152A/B Joint Programmable Bomb Fuze System into the UAE Armed Forces General Headquarters' fleet of aircraft and associated weapons
63.	3-Jun-19	United Kingdom	DCS	\$209,000,000	To support the manufacture of the Aurora Fuzing System for the Paveway IV Precision Guided Bomb Program for end use by the United Kingdom Ministry of Defense and the Royal Saudi Air Force
64.	3-Jun-19	Saudi Arabia	DCS	\$175,900,000	To provide technically qualified personnel to advise and assist the Royal Saudi Air Force (RSAF) in maintenance and training for the RSAF F-15 fleet of aircraft

65.	3-Jun-19	Jordan	DCS	\$99,500,000	the certification of a proposed license for the retransfer of defense articles, of Paveway II laser guided bombs to Jordan
66.	3-Jun-19	Global	DCS	\$76,000,000	To India, Saudi Arabia, Israel, and the Republic of Korea to support the manufacture, production, test, inspection, modification, enhancement, rework, and repair of F/A18E/F and derivative series aircraft panels
67.	3-Jun-19	Global	DCS	\$70,939,999	To Saudi Arabia and the UAE to support the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia Ministry of Defense Transformation Project
68.	3-Jun-19	Saudi Arabia	DCS	\$50,835,000	120mm M933A1 mortar bombs to Saudi Arabia for end use by the Saudi Arabian Royal Land Forces
69.	3-Jun-19	Global	DCS	\$12,000,000	To Australia, the United Kingdom, and the UAE to support the marketing, sale, and on-going support of Unmanned Aerial Systems and support for future Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) requirements for the UAE Armed Forces
70.	3-Jun-19	UAE	DCS	\$1,364,900	.50 caliber semi-automatic rifles and sound suppressors to the UAE for end use by the General Headquarters, UAE Armed Forces
71.	3-Jun-19	UAE	DCS	\$1,000,000	<i>To support the installation, integration, modification, maintenance, and repair for F110-GE-132 gas turbine engines for use in F-16 Aircraft</i>
72.	11-Jun-19	Global	DCS	\$6,744,000	To the Republic of Korea and Singapore to support the manufacture, integration, installation, operation, training, testing, maintenance, and repair of the F-15 Wide Field of View (WFOV) Heads-up Display (HUD)
73.	12-Jun-19	United Kingdom	DCS	\$2,667,900,000	To support the manufacture, design, assembly, qualification, test, repair, and maintenance of the F-35 electrical power management system
74.	12-Jun-19	Japan	DCS	\$50,000,000	License amendment to support the operation, installation, provisioning of organizational and intermediate level maintenance and repairs of the MK15 Phalanx Close-In Weapon System Block 0-IB Baseline 2 and SeaRAM Weapon System Defense Articles for end-use by the Ministry of Defense for Japan
75.	12-Jun-19	Netherlands	DCS	\$1,259,716	MAG58 7.62mm machine guns and associated barrel assemblies to the Ministry of Defense
76.	19-Jun-19	Denmark	DCS	\$25,000,000	<i>To support the integration, installation, operation, training, testing, maintenance, and repair of the Joint Direct Attack Munition (JDAM), Small Diameter Bomb, and Laser Small Diameter Bomb onto the F-16 and F-35 aircraft</i>

77.	19-Jun-19	Global	DCS	\$12,064,000	To Germany and the United Kingdom to support the design, development, production, manufacture, assembly, operation, repair, testing, maintenance, and modification to develop P200-P400 series gas turbine engines
78.	20-Jun-19	Japan	DCS	\$850,890,000	To support the transfer, modification, maintenance, and repair for F135 propulsion system for the F-35 Lightning II for use by the Government of Japan
79.	20-Jun-19	United Kingdom	DCS	\$85,000,000	Proposed license for the export of defense articles, including technical data and defense services, to France, Germany, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom to support the testing, installation, interfacing, and training in operation and intermediate level of maintenance of the Ammunition Handling System for the United Kingdom's Specialist Vehicle Program; to support the testing, installation, interfacing, and training in operation and intermediate level of maintenance of the Ammunition Handling System for the United Kingdom's Specialist Vehicle Program
80.	21-Jun-19	United States	DCS	\$151,650,000	Amendment to a manufacturing license agreement to the United Kingdom to support the design, development, engineering, production, assembly, testing, repair, rework, maintenance, modification, operation, and processing of components and parts for integration into the TOW (Tube-launched Optically tracked Wireless-guided) Missile System for end use by Raytheon in the United States
81.	22-Jun-19	Israel	DCS	\$110,002,506	To support the qualification, modification, test, repair, assembly, manufacture, and production of components and parts for integration into the Tamir Interceptor used in the Iron Dome Program
82.	23-Jun-19	Italy	DCS	\$351,395,000	License amendment for a manufacturing agreement to support the installation, integration, modification, maintenance, and repair for Advanced Rail Launchers for use in F-35 Joint Strike Fighter aircraft
83.	24-Jun-19	Denmark	DCS	\$14,910,000	To support the integration, installation, operation, training, testing, maintenance, and repair of the Joint Direct Attack Munition (JDAM), Small Diameter Bomb, and Laser Small Diameter Bomb onto the F-16 and F-35
84.	27-Jun-19	United Kingdom	DCS	\$1,207,000,000	To support the maintenance, repair, and overhaul of the F135 propulsion system powering the F-35 Lightning II aircraft
85.	27-Jun-19	Morocco	FMS	\$250,400,000	A continuation of sustainment support to its current F-16 fleet to include the following non-MDE components

86.	28-Jun-19	Germany	FMS	\$122,860,000	Up to ninety-one (91) AGM-88E Advanced Anti-Radiation Guided Missile (AARGM) Tactical Missiles, and up to eight (8) AGM-88E AARGM Captive Air Training Missiles (CATM)
87.	28-Jun-19	India	DCS	\$72,000,500	7.62mm automatic rifles and parts to India for the Indian Armed Forces
88.	8-Jul-19	Taiwan	FMS	\$2,000,000,000	M1A2T Abrams Tanks and related equipment and support
89.	8-Jul-19	Israel	DCS	\$4,925,000	To support the development and manufacture of component parts of pistols and rifles
90.	9-Jul-19	Taiwan	FMS	\$223,560,000	Stinger missiles and related equipment
91.	12-Jul-19	Greece	FMS	\$600,000,000	MH-60R Multi-Mission Helicopters with support
92.	12-Jul-19	Germany	FMS	\$401,000,000	Patriot Advanced Capability 3 (PAC-3) Missiles Segment Enhanced (MSE) with support
93.	26-Jul-19	India	FMS	\$670,000,000	C-17 sustainment follow-on support
94.	26-Jul-19	Thailand	FMS	\$175,000,000	60 Stryker infantry carrier vehicles with equipment and support
95.	26-Jul-19	Pakistan	FMS	\$125,000,000	Technical Security Team (TST) in continued support of the F-16 program
96.	30-Jul-19	South Korea	FMS	\$950,000,000	Contractor Logistics Support (CLS) for RQ-4 Block 30 Remotely Piloted Aircraft (RPS)
97.	30-Jul-19	Egypt	FMS	\$554,000,000	Follow-On Technical Support (FOTS) for various ships
98.	30-Jul-19	Canada	FMS	\$44,000,000	To Canada of one hundred fifty-two (152) MIDS-JTRS (5) with support
99.	7-Aug-19	South Korea	FMS	\$800,000,000	MH-60R Multi-Mission Helicopters with support
100.	20-Aug-19	Taiwan	FMS	\$8,000,000,000	66 F-16C/D Block 70 aircraft and related equipment and support
101.	27-Aug-19	Japan	FMS	\$3,295,000,000	Up to seventy-three (73) Standard Missile-3 (SM-3) Block IIA with support
102.	27-Aug-19	Hungary	FMS	\$500,000,000	One hundred and eighty (180) AIM-120C-7 Advanced Medium Range Air-to-Air Missiles (AMRAAM) with support
103.	27-Aug-19	Denmark	FMS	\$200,000,000	Nine (9) AN/AQS-22 Airborne Low Frequency Sonar (ALFS) systems and six hundred (600) AN/SSQ-36/53/62 Sonobuoys with support
104.	27-Aug-19	Lithuania	FMS	\$170,800,000	Five hundred Joint Light Tactical Vehicles with support
105.	27-Aug-19	South Korea	FMS	\$72,000,000	Thirty-one (31) MK 54 All Up Round lightweight torpedoes with support
106.	10-Sep-19	Australia	DCS	\$100,000,000	<i>to support the manufacture of F-35 weapons adapters</i>
107.	10-Sep-19	South Korea	DCS	\$50,000,000	<i>To support the manufacture of selected T700/701K parts of the Korea Utility Helicopter (Surion Helicopter)</i>
108.	11-Sep-19	Poland	FMS	\$6,500,000,000	Thirty-two (32) F-35 Joint Strike Fighter aircraft with support

109.	11-Sep-19	Thailand	DCS	\$35,545,012	M16A4, M4, and MS 5.56mm automatic rifles and parts for end use by the Royal Thai Army
110.	12-Sep-19	Morocco	FMS	\$776,000,000	Various TOW-2A missiles
111.	12-Sep-19	Morocco	FMS	\$209,000,000	Additional F-16 ammunition
112.	16-Sep-19	Thailand	DCS	\$1,447,297	M16A4 upgrade kits
113.	19-Sep-19	Taiwan	DCS	\$125,500,000	To support the 30/40mm MK44 Bushmaster Automatic Cannon System and associated Ammunition Handling System for the Clouded Leopard Vehicle Program
114.	24-Sep-19	Thailand	FMS	\$400,000,000	Eight (8) AH-6i light attack reconnaissance helicopters and related equipment
115.	24-Sep-19	Qatar	FMS	\$86,000,000	Two AN/AAQ-24(V)N Large Aircraft Infrared Countermeasures (LAIRCM) systems and related equipment
116.	25-Sep-19	South Korea	DCS	\$50,000,000	To support the assembly, inspection, test and production of T700/701K engine for end use on the Korean Helicopter Program
117.	1-Oct-19	Japan	FMS	\$140,000,000	Follow-On Technical Support (FOTS) sustainment and services in support of eight (8) Japan AEGIS Destroyers consisting of four (4) KONGO Class Destroyers, two (2) ATAGO Class Destroyers, two (2) MAYA Class Destroyers and one (1) Japanese Computer Test Site (JCPTS)
118.	3-Oct-19	Ukraine	FMS	\$39,200,000	To Ukraine for one hundred fifty (150) Javelin missiles and related equipment and support
119.	10-Oct-19	Kuwait	FMS	\$281,000,000	Nineteen (19) M88A2 Heavy Equipment Recovery Combat Utility Lifting Extraction System (HERCULES) recovery vehicles and related equipment and support
120.	10-Oct-19	Tunisia	FMS	\$234,000,000	Twelve (12) T-6C Texan trainer aircraft and related equipment and support
121.	17-Oct-19	South Korea	FMS	\$253,000,000	One-hundred and Twenty (120) AIM-120C-7/C-8 Advanced Medium Range Air-to-Air Missiles (AMRAAM) with support
122.	22-Oct-19	Australia	DCS	\$100,000,000	P-8A aircraft for the execution, sustainment, and follow-on development to support the Maritime Patrol and Reconnaissance Aircraft program
123.	22-Oct-19	Japan	DCS	\$100,000,000	For the production of the MK41 Vertical Launching System (VLS)
124.	22-Oct-19	Algeria	DCS	\$50,000,000	To support the transfer, modification, maintenance, and repair for Mine Resistant Ambush Protected (MRAP) vehicles
125.	22-Oct-19	Oman	DCS	\$1,000,000	7.62 mm machine guns
126.	22-Oct-19	Denmark	DCS	\$1,000,000	7.62mm machine guns and spare parts
127.	22-Oct-19	Brazil	DCS	\$1,000,000	9 mm semi-automatic pistols and spare barrels
128.	23-Oct-19	Bahrain	FMS	\$150,000,000	To refurbish the Oliver Hazard Perry Class ship, ex ROBERT G. BRADLEY (FFG 49) with support

129.	29-Oct-19	Japan	FMS	\$4,500,000,000	The upgrade of up to ninety-eight (98) F-15J aircraft to a Japanese Super Interceptor (JSI) configuration
130.	30-Oct-19	Croatia	FMS	\$115,000,000	Two (2) UH-60M Black Hawk helicopters and related equipment
131.	30-Oct-19	United Kingdom	DCS	\$100,000,000	To support the design, development, manufacture, productions, qualification, repair, and rework of the guidance electronic assemblies (GEAs), circuit cards assemblies (CCAs), electronic modules, power supplies, and associated electronic and mechanical assemblies, subassemblies, components, and test equipment for the Excalibur Increment 1b Guided Munitions Weapon System
132.	30-Oct-19	South Korea	DCS	\$100,000,000	To support the manufacture, assembly, and testing of subassemblies for the MK45 Mod 4 Gun Mount
133.	30-Oct-19	Global	DCS	\$50,000,000	To Italy, the UK, Switzerland, and the Czech Republic to support the development, modification, installation, integration, test, operation, and use of mechanical, avionics, environmental, and lighting systems for the C27J
134.	30-Oct-19	Norway	DCS	\$17,081,146	.50 caliber automatic machine guns and associated parts and spares
135.	30-Oct-19	Qatar	DCS	\$2,100,500	To support the design, tooling creation, and production line setup to produce, assemble, field, and maintain a weapon mounted flashlight system incorporating visible and infrared lights and laser pointers
136.	7-Nov-19	United Arab Emirates	FMS	\$830,300,000	Ten (10) CH-47F Chinook cargo helicopters and related equipment
137.	19-Nov-19	Morocco	FMS	\$4,250,000,000	AH-64E Helicopters
138.	19-Nov-19	India	FMS	\$1,021,000,000	MK 45 Gun System
139.	20-Nov-19	New Zealand	FMS	\$1,400,000,000	C-130J Aircraft
140.	20-Nov-19	Australia	FMS	\$245,000,000	JCREW Systems and Support
141.	20-Nov-19	Global	DCS	\$1,000,000	To Italy and Qatar to support the manufacture, integration, assembly, operation, training, testing, and maintenance of 300 Blackout 5.56mm upper and lower receivers and weapon assembly
142.	3-Dec-19	Philippines	DCS	\$39,550,000	License for manufacture and export of 22 Magnum pistols
143.	3-Dec-19	Netherlands	DCS	\$2,696,749	688 SIGMCX .300 caliber automatic assault rifles and spare parts
144.	4-Dec-19	Qatar	DCS	\$1,000,000	Automatic rifles
145.	10-Dec-19	Australia	DCS	\$100,000,000	Support of the F135 propulsion system for end use in the F-35 Lightning II Joint Strike Fighter aircraft
146.	10-Dec-19	Qatar	DCS	\$1,000,000	Automatic rifles
147.	10-Dec-19	Kuwait	DCS	\$1,000,000	5.56mm automatic rifles
148.	19-Dec-19	Argentina	FMS	\$78,032,000	Support for EDA P-3C Aircraft

ENDNOTES

1. This analysis marks the third annual assessment of arms sales trends conducted by the Center for International Policy's Security Assistance Monitor (SAM). For the earlier SAM trends reports see William Hartung, "Trends in Major U.S. Arms Sales in 2017: A Comparison of the Obama and Trump Administrations," Center for International Policy, March 2018, available at https://docs.wixstatic.com/ugd/488e54_5bec354ab31a49c7b16c5254f27f373c.pdf; and William D. Hartung and Christina Arabia, "Trends in Major Arms Sales 2018: The Trump Record – Rhetoric Versus Reality," Center for International Policy, April 2019, available at https://static.wixstatic.com/ugd/3ba8a1_44475f2b94464e77b57c6d33953dc939.pdf
2. Figures on total arms offers in the first three years of the Trump administration are compiled by the Security Assistance Monitor from Congressional notifications on Foreign Military Sales (FMS) brokered by the Pentagon and Commercial Sales licensed by the State Department. Figures on FMS offers during the Obama and Trump years are from the Defense Security Cooperation Agency's listing of arms sales notifications to Congress from 2009 to present, adjusted for inflation and expressed in 2020 dollars, using the Office of Management and Budget's chained GDP price index.
3. For extensive documentation of the Trump administration's changes in regulations on guns and ammunition and their impacts see the Forum on the Arms Trade's resource page on the subject, available at <https://www.forumarmstrade.org/catitooiii.html>
4. Adotei Akwei, "New U.S. Arms Exports Rule Will Spread Violence Beyond Borders," *Global Post*, January 28, 2020, at <https://theglobepost.com/2020/01/28/us-gun-exports/>; Josh Rogin, "New Trump Rules Could Put American Guns in the Hands of Dictators, Terrorists, and Gangs," *Washington Post*, September 24, 2017, at https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/global-opinions/new-trump-rules-could-put-american-guns-in-the-hands-of-dictators-terrorists-and-gangs/2017/09/24/7daa4ffe-9fe2-11e7-9c8d-cf053ff30921_story.html; and William D. Hartung, "Deregulating Firearms Exports Risks Putting Guns in the Wrong Hands," *The Hill*, May 24, 2018, at <https://thehill.com/opinion/national-security/389255-deregulating-firearms-exports-risks-putting-guns-in-the-wrong-hands>
5. The Stop Arming Human Rights Abusers Act is part of a package of bills by Rep. Omar entitled "Pathway to Peace," background available at <https://omar.house.gov/media/press-releases/rep-omar-introduces-pathway-peace-bold-foreign-policy-vision-united-states> For an analysis of the bill, see William D. Hartung, "Stop Arming Repressive Regimes," *Forbes*, February 19, 2020, at <https://www.forbes.com/sites/williamhartung/2020/02/19/stop-arming-repressive-regimes/#2b03422b7a65>
6. For a summary of President Trump's approach to arms sales see the prior versions of this report, *Trends in Major Arms Sales 2018: The Trump Record – Rhetoric Versus Reality*, Security Assistance Monitor, April 2019, at <https://securityassistance.org/publication/trends-major-us-arms-sales-2018-trump-record-rhetoric-versus-reality>; and *Trends in Major Arms Sales 2017: A Comparison of the Obama and Trump Administrations*, Security Assistance Monitor, March 2018, available at <https://securityassistance.org/publication/trump-makes-over-80-billion-major-arms-deals-first-year>
7. Figures on total arms offers in the first three years of the Trump administration are compiled by the Security Assistance Monitor from Congressional notifications on Foreign Military Sales (FMS) brokered by the Pentagon and Commercial Sales licensed by the State Department. Figures on FMS offers during the Obama and Trump years are from the Defense Security Cooperation Agency's listing of arms sales notifications to Congress from 2009 to present, adjusted for inflation.
8. Unless otherwise noted, data presented in this report is compiled and analyzed by the Security Assistance Monitor drawing on notifications to Congress from the Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) and the U.S. Department of State, covering both Foreign Military Sales brokered and implemented by the Pentagon and Commercial Sales licensed by the State Department.
9. The \$102 billion figure in arms offers for 2010 is based on notifications to Congress posted on the web site of the Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA), available here: <https://www.dsca.mil/major-arms-sales> It is a conservative figure, in that it does not include a full accounting of Commercial Sales licensed by the State Department. It is important to note that not all offers result in final sales, but rather indicate the fruits of preliminary negotiations that provide an outline of a potential deal that has received Congressional sign-off. Nonetheless, figures on offers provide a good guide to trends

in potential sales and are more timely than other measures, which can lag by a year or more from the time a deal has been made.

10. The Saudi total includes a \$1.571 billion deal that was primarily for Paveway guided bombs for the Royal Saudi Air Force, but the deal also included some work for Germany and the United Kingdom adapting European-supplied Tornado aircraft to be able to use the Paveways.

11. For an earlier analysis of the administration's alleged mega-deal with Saudi Arabia, see Glenn Kessler, "Trump's \$110 Billion in Arms Sales to Saudi Arabia – Still Fake," *Washington Post*, October 11, 2018, at <https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2018/10/11/trumps-billion-arms-sales-saudi-arabia-still-fake/>

12. For a review of U.S. arms sales to Saudi Arabia that covers the two terms of the Obama administration see William D. Hartung, "U.S. Military Support for Saudi Arabia and the War In Yemen," Center for International Policy, November 2018, at https://docs.wixstatic.com/ugd/3ba8a1_5e9019d625e84087af647e6cb91ea3e2.pdf

13. A brief note on methodology – though specific data on how the \$1.571 billion deal was divided between its multiple recipients is not available, the authors have decided to remove this from the list of "Global" sales and attribute it squarely to Saudi Arabia. The departure from traditional methodology relates to the intense public and congressional scrutiny the sale received specifically because of its ties to Saudi Arabia. The Kingdom appears to have been the principal recipient of the munitions, this report lists it as a sale to Riyadh. Nevertheless, even including this offer to the Kingdom would raise total offers to \$5.08 billion in 2019, roughly equal to 2018 but far lower than the \$17 billion reached during the first year of the Trump administration.

14. For background on the Turkish invasion of Syria, see Zia Wiese, "Turkey's Invasion of Syria Explained," *Politico*, October 15, 2019, available at <https://www.politico.eu/article/8-questions-about-turkeys-incursion-into-syria-answered/>

15. See fact sheets by Elias Yousif of the Security Assistance Monitor, "Security Assistance in Focus: Turkey," and "Security Assistance in Focus: Syria," released on October 11, 2019 and October 10, 2019, respectively, and available at http://securityassistance.org/fact_sheet/security-assistance-focus-turkey and http://securityassistance.org/fact_sheet/security-assistance-focus-syria; see also William D. Hartung, "Turkey's Invasion of Syria, Made in the USA," *Forbes*, October 10, 2019, at <https://www.forbes.com/sites/williamhartung/2019/10/10/turkeys-invasion-of-syria-made-in-the-usa/#4b74299b5483>

16. "Philippines, Events of 2019," Human Rights Watch, *World Report 2020*, Philippines section available at <https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2020/country-chapters/philippines>

17. See Elias Yousif, "Afghan Security Aid Budget and the Prospects for Peace," Security Assistance Monitor, February 22, 2020, at http://securityassistance.org/fact_sheet/issue-brief-afghan-security-aid-amidst-prospects-peace

18. Office of the Secretary of Defense, "Justification for Fiscal Year 2020 Overseas Contingency Operations, Afghan Security Forces Fund," March 2019, p. 5.

19. Sebastien Roblin, "More U.S.-India Arms Sales Could Follow \$3.5 Billion Helicopter Deal," *Forbes*, February 26, 2020, at <https://www.forbes.com/sites/sebastienroblin/2020/02/26/modi-and-trump-sign-35-billion-helicopter-deal-more-could-follow/#423d329423aa>

20. "Brazil, Events of 2019," Human Rights Watch World Report 2020, Brazil section available here: <https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2020/country-chapters/brazil>

21. Op cit., see note 6.

22. Op. cit., see note 8.

23. For extensive documentation of the Trump administration's changes in regulations on guns and ammunition and their impacts see the Forum on the Arms Trade's resource page on the subject, available at <https://www.forumarmstrade.org/catitoiii.html>

24. Adotei Akwei, "New U.S. Arms Exports Rule Will Spread Violence Beyond Borders," *Global Post*, January 28, 2020, at <https://theglobepost.com/2020/01/28/us-gun-exports/>; Josh Rogin, "New Trump Rules Could Put American Guns in the Hands of Dictators, Terrorists, and Gangs," *Washington Post*, September 24, 2017, at https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/global-opinions/new-trump-rules-could-put-american-guns-in-the-hands-of-dictators-terrorists-and-gangs/2017/09/24/7daa4ffe-9fe2-11e7-9c8d-cf053ff30921_story.html; and William D. Hartung, "Deregulating Firearms Exports Risks Putting Guns in the Wrong Hands," *The Hill*, May 24, 2018, at <https://thehill.com/opinion/national-security/389255-deregulating-firearms-exports-risks-putting-guns-in-the-wrong-hands>
25. On relative job creation from different forms of spending, see Heidi Garrett-Peltier, "War Spending and Lost Opportunities," Costs of War Project, Brown University, which estimates 6.9 jobs per \$1 million spent on defense activities, at <https://watson.brown.edu/costsofwar/files/cow/imce/papers/2019/March%202019%20Job%20Opportunity%20Cost%20of%20War.pdf>
26. Glenn Kessler, "Trump's Claim of Jobs From Saudi Arms Sales Grows By Leaps and Bounds," *Washington Post*, October 22, 2018, at <https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2018/10/22/trumps-claim-jobs-saudi-deals-grows-by-leaps-bounds/>
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29. See Hartung, "U.S. Support for Saudi Arabia and the War in Yemen," *op. cit.*, pp. 10-11.
30. For an analysis of the jobs generated by defense spending, see Heidi Garrett-Peltier, "War Spending and Lost Opportunities," *op. cit.*; data on arms sales deliveries is from U.S. Department of Defense, Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA), *Historical Facts Book as of September 30, 2017*, p. 16; data on the size of the U.S. Labor Force are from U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics.
31. Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, *Vision 2030*, at <https://www.vision2030.gov.sa/en>
32. Vera Bergengruen, "Trump's Historic Arms Deal is Likely a Jobs Creator – In Saudi Arabia," *McClatchey News Service*, May 24, 2017, at <https://www.mcclatchydc.com/news/politics-government/white-house/article152464404.html>
33. Chirine Mouchantaf, "Boeing Establishes Joint Venture With Saudi Arabian Military Industries for Aircraft Maintenance," *Defense News*, April 13, 2018, cited in Jodi Vitori, *A Mutual Extortion Racket: The Military-Industrial Complex and U.S. Foreign Policy – The Cases of Saudi Arabia and UAE*, Transparency International Defense and Security Program, 2019, p. 15; the *Defense News* piece is available at <https://www.defensenews.com/global/mideast-africa/2018/04/13/boeing-establishes-joint-venture-with-saudi-arabian-military-industries-for-aircraft-maintenance/>
34. Statement of Marilyn Hewson, CEO, Lockheed Martin Corporation, at the Global Summit of Women Speakers of Parliament, Abu Dhabi, December 13, 2016 at <https://lockheedmartin.com/en-us/news/statements-speeches/2016/1213-hewson-global-summit-women-speakers-parliament-uae.html>
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36. Alex Ward, "Senate Passes Resolution to End U.S. Role in Yemen War – Again," *Vox*, March 13, 2019, at <https://www.vox.com/2019/3/13/18263894/yemen-war-senate-sanders-murphy-lee>; and Jacob Pramuk, "House Votes to End U.S. Support for Yemen Conflict, Setting Up Trump's Second Veto," *CNBC.com*, April 4, 2019, at <https://www.cnn.com/2019/04/04/house-passes-yemen-war-powers-resolution-setting-up-trump-veto.html>
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38. Rep. Norma Torres (D-CA), "Trump Move to Slacken Firearms Sale Regs Helps Terrorists at America's Expense," press release, January 27, 2020, at <https://torres.house.gov/media-center/press-releases/rep-torres-trump-move-slacken-fire-arm-sale-regs-helps-terrorists-america>
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